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AN OTHER HISTORY OF KNOWLEDGE AND DECISION IN
PRECAUTIONARY APPROACHES TO SUSTAINABILITY
SaptarishiBandopadhyay*
"If there are connections everywhere, why do we persist in turning
dynamic, interconnectedphenomena into static, disconnected things?
Some of this is owing, perhaps, to the way we have learned our own
history.
"Our attitude towardspoisons has undergone a subtle change. ,2
INTRODUCTION

Last year, a post in The Guardian reiterated the popular notion that
"[t]he 'Precautionary Principle' 3 is a blunt instrument, a 90s
* For my friend Reema Ray (1982-2013). S.J.D. Candidate, Harvard Law School.
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thank Duncan Kennedy, Sheila Jasanoff, Jane Fair Bestor, and Lisa Kelly for their
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Siddhartha Velandy, Courtney Walsh, Asma Pataudi, Christopher Taggart, and
Rachel Liebman, as friends and colleagues, were early and enduring sources of
encouragement. I am thankful to Jason Robison, Daniel Vargas, and Yun Ru Chen
for organizing the Graduate Program Forum Panel on State and Nature: Global
Perspectives on Institutions for Environmental Governance in the 21st Century

(Harvard Law School, Apr. 2011) and engaging with initial thoughts on the project.
The organizers and participants of the Institute For Global Law & Policy's 2013

Conference (Harvard Law School, June 2013) contributed much by their thoughtful
commentary on an earlier draft. Further thanks are owed to M. P. Ram Mohan,
Anand Jayachandran, A. V. N'Gurz, Stephen Wiles, Teresa Saint-Amour, and
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here are my own, and other usual caveats apply.
1. ERIC R. WOLF, EUROPE AND THE PEOPLE WITHOUT HISTORY 4-5 (1982).
2. RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING 155 (1962).
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throwback out of place in an era of 'smart solutions' and big data." 4
Such remarks are not unusual descriptors for a principle that has been
described as everything from irresponsible to anti-democratic and
more. And yet, constitutions, legislations, policies, and judicial
decisions continue to endorse the terms while struggling to refine its
3. The Precautionary Principle facilitates decision-making to protect the
environment despite uncertainty as to the nature and scope of a threat. See United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janiero, Braz., June
3-14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc.

A/CONF.151/5/Rev.1, Principle 15 [hereinafter Rio Declaration]. For an
introduction to the Precautionary Principle as a legal principle, see P. SANDS,
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 266-79 (2003). See also
Case C- 180/96, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Comm'n
of the Eur. Cmtys., 1998 E.C.R. 1-2265, 99, where the European Court of Justice
states, "When there is uncertainty as to the existence or extent of risks to human
health, the institutions may take protective measures without having to wait until
the reality and seriousness of those risks become fully apparent." The Court in that
case was relying on Article 174(2) of the European Commission (EC) Treaty (then,
Article 13 Or), which incorporates the Precautionary Principle; Case T-13/99, Pfizer
Animal Health SA v. Council of the European Union, 2002 E.C.R. 11-3305,
141,
335; Rio Declaration, supra (stating, "In order to protect the environment, the
precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to their
capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full
scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective
measures to prevent environmental degradation."); Paul Johnston & David Santillo,
The PrecautionaryPrinciple:A Barrier to Innovation and Progress, GREENPEACE

(2006), http://www.greenpeace.to/greenpeace/wp-content/uploads/
2011/05/precaution-and-innovation.pdf.
RESEARCH LAB.

4. Tracey Brown, The Precautionary Principle Is a Blunt Instrument,

(July 9, 2013, 2:30 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/science/politicalscience/2013/jul/09/precautionary-principle-blunt-instrument.
5. Despite controversy as to whether or not the Precautionary Principle is a
part of international legal custom, the Principle has already been widely
incorporated into the policies and rhetoric of a large number of states and
international institutions. See, e.g., 1958 CONST. pmbl. (Fr.) (giving constitutional
authority to the Charter for the Environment of 2004); A.P. Pollution Control Bd.
v. Prof. M.V. Nayudu (Retd.) and Ors., A.I.R. 1999 S.C. 812,
29-38 (India);
GUARDIAN

Communicationfrom the Commission on the PrecautionaryPrinciple,COMM'N OF
EURO. CMTYS. (2000) 1 final (Feb. 2, 2000), http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/
health-consumer/library/pub/pub07_en.pdf [hereinafter Communication]; Andrew
THE

Jordan & Timothy O'Riordan, The PrecautionaryPrinciple in UK Environmental

Law and Policy (CSERGE Working Paper No. GEC 94-11, 1994), available at
http://www.cserge.ac.uk/sites/default/files/gec_1994_11.pdf; BRIAN J. PRESTON,
ECOLOGICAL SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN THE COURTS IN AUSTRALIA AND

ASIA 12-20 (2006), available at http://www.lec.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/agdbasev7wr/
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meaning as something more than a blanket ban-a strategy that is
indeed "blunt." In this Article, I offer an alternative reading of
precaution, with the hope of recovering the capacity of this ethic to
-6
facilitate legal and political decisions.
Since the Precautionary Principle began to gain international
recognition in the early 1980s, 7 its interpretation within treaties,
judicial decisions, and commentary have shuffled along a number of

assets/lec/m4203011721754/preston ecologically%20sustainable%20development
%20in%20the%20courts%20in%20australia%20and%20asia.pdf; discussion supra
Part III (about Germany). Despite governmental resistance (see SANDS, supra note
3, at 268), this Principle seems to be gaining ground even within the United States.
See, e.g., WINGSPREAD STATEMENT ON THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (1998),

available at http://www.who.int/ifcs/documents/forums/forum5/wingspread.doc;
see also Nancy Myers, The PrecautionaryPrinciplePuts Values First,22 BULL. OF
SCI., TECH. & SoC'Y 210, 211-12 (2002) (describing how information about the

Precautionary Principle has grown in demand across citizens and organizations
within the United States). Further, North American businesses and production
facilities have continued to pervade foreign, and often less developed, states that
have previously faced devastation at the hands of foreign investment. See, e.g.,
Union Carbide v. Union of India, (1989) 3 S.C.C. 38 (India); Chronology, BHOPAL
INFO. CTR., available at http://www.bhopal.com/chrono.htm

(last updated Nov.

2013).
6. For a discussion of decisionism in legal theory, see Duncan Kennedy, A
Semiotics of Critique,22 CARDOZo L. REV. 1147, 1162-67 (2001); see also Walter
Kaufmann, Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre, in EXISTENTIALISM FROM
DOSTOEVSKY TO SARTRE 11, 11-51 (Walter Kaufmann ed., rev. & expanded ed.

1975) (discussing the relationship between experiential ethics and decision).
7. The following data-points are touched on by most of the commentary on the
subject. See Arie Trouwborst, Prevention, Precaution, Logic and Law: The
Relationship between the PrecautionaryPrinciple and the Preventative Principle
in International and Associated Questions, 2 ERASMUS L. REV. 105, 107-10

(2009). Widely acknowledged as drawn from the German environmental policy of
Vorsorgeprinzip, the Precautionary Principle began to gain in popularity in the
1980s, when it was integrated into a number of international instruments. See, e.g.,
Resolution on World Charter for Nature, G.A. Res., 37/7, U.N. Doc. A/RES/37/7,
Principle 11 (Oct. 28, 1982) [hereinafter World Charter for Nature]; see also Rio
Declaration,supra note 3, Principle 15. For a discussion of Vorsorge, see infra
Part III; Sonja Boehmer-Christiansen, The PrecautionaryPrinciple in GermanyEnabling Government, in INTERPRETING

THE PRECAUTIONARY

PRINCIPLE 31

(Timothy O'Riordan & James Cameron eds., 1994); NICOLAS DE SADELEER,
ENVIRONMENTAL PRINCIPLES: FROM POLITICAL SLOGANS To LEGAL RULES 93,

125-30 (2002).
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well-worn trails.8 In virtually all such instances, decision-makers and
commentators have understood this Principle to reflect an
immemorial 9 and natural (and therefore apolitical) instincto for
8. A few instances will suffice: First, there are discussions that identify
differences between the various descriptions of the principle across international
instruments. See, e.g., David VanderZwaag, The Precautionary Principle in
Environmental Law and Policy: Elusive Rhetoric and First Embraces, 8 J. ENVTL.

L. & PRAc. 355 (1999). Second, there are comments on how the changed
terminology
raises, lowers, or otherwise alters the corresponding
obligations/standards of states under international environmental law. Of the
remarkable volume of writing on this second aspect, Daniel Bodansky's work is a
comprehensive illustration. See, e.g., Daniel Bodansky, Deconstructing the
PrecautionaryPrinciple, in BRINGING NEW LAW TO OCEAN WATERS 381 (David
D. Caron & Harry N. Scheiber eds., 2004) [hereinafter Bodansky, Deconstructing]
(discussing the existing orientations of the Precautionary Principle: as a negative
mandate (that seeks to legitimize environmental protection measures, when
independently taken, in the face of scientific uncertainty as to harm); its positive
description (that supplies an affirmative obligation as a license or a duty to act to
protect the environment); and its temporal and potentiality-of-harm aspects
(involving debates on when the principle may be considered activated and
applicable); as well as the related evidentiary requirements to attest that such
activation is legitimate). A third order of descriptions analyzes the status of the
Precautionary Principle in the context of international custom. See, e.g., Owen
McIntyre & Thomas Mosedale, The Precautionary Principle as a Norm of
Customary International Law, 9 J. ENVTL. L. 221, 221-41 (1997); Daniel
Bodansky, Customary (and Not So Customary) InternationalEnvironmental Law,

3 GLOBAL LEG. STUD. J. 105 (1991). Alternatively, a fourth form of discussions
considers whether the Precautionary Principle is a legal norm at all. See, e.g.,
SANDS, supra note 3, at 266-79. As readers familiar with legal argument will
appreciate, however, too often such discussions restrict themselves to analyzing the
value of signifiers such as "shall" and "should" across legal rules. A fifth approach
describes the Precautionary Principle as a policy orientation. See, e.g., ARIE
TROUWBORST, EVOLUTION AND STATUS OF THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN
LAW 4-6 (2002). Alternatively, a sixth variation counts the
Precautionary Principle as an approach. See, e.g., Ellen Hey, The Precautionary
INTERNATIONAL

Concept in Environmental Policy and Law: Institutionalizing Caution, 4 GEO.

INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 303, 308 (1992). Finally, a seventh trend takes up the task of
exploring the kinds of actions and measures that may actually be considered
"precautionary." See, e.g., Christopher D. Stone, Is There a Precautionary
Principle,31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10790, 10799 (2001).
9. See, e.g., TROUWBORST, supra note 8, at 8, listing a variety of adages

explaining why "precaution strikes such a common chord." Samples include: "an
ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure," "a stitch in time saves nine,"
"discretion is the better part of valour," and "better safe than sorry." Id. We should
remember, however, that in their meaning and implications, such phrases resemble
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preserving the natural environment in the event of scientific
uncertainty as to the consequences of human intervention.11 By
contrast, I argue that "precaution" and "sustainability" should be

others such as "stone's throw," "within earshot," or "bucketful," that we know
arose from actual political struggles involving the quantification of space
(/distance) and quantity (/volume). See JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE 25
(1998).
10. Myers, supra note 5, at 210 (describing the Precautionary Principle as
representing "the normal human instinct for self-preservation."). The Principle has
also been held to reflect "intuition" and "common sense." See Timothy O'Riordan
& Andrew Jordan, The PrecautionaryPrinciple in Contemporary Environmental
Politics, 4 ENVTL. VALUES 191, 192 (1995) ("an intuitively simple guide to

humans on how to intervene in environmental systems in a manner that is less
damaging."). See also id. at 193-94; TROUWBORST, supra note 8, at ch. 2.1, n.10
(and corresponding text) ("the precautionary principle is a statement of
commonsense and has already been applied by decision-makers in appropriate
circumstances prior to the principle being spelt out ... Its premise is that where
uncertainty or ignorance exists concerning the nature or scope of environmental
harm ... decision-makers should be cautious . . .").
11. World Charter for Nature, supra note 7. Principle 11 states:
Activities which might have an impact on nature shall be
controlled, and the best available technologies that minimize
significant risks to nature or other adverse effects shall be used;
in particular:
(a) Activities which are likely to cause irreversible damage to
nature shall be avoided; (b) Activities which are likely to pose a
significant risk to nature shall be preceded by an exhaustive
examination; their proponents shall demonstrate that expected
benefits outweigh potential damage to nature, and where
potential adverse effects are not fully understood, the activities
should not proceed; (c) Activities which may disturb nature shall
be preceded by assessment of their consequences, and
environmental impact studies of development projects shall be
conducted sufficiently in advance, and if they are to be
undertaken, such activities shall be planned and carried out so as
to minimize potential adverse effects; (d) Agriculture, grazing,
forestry and fisheries practices shall be adapted to the natural
characteristics and constraints of given areas; (e) Areas degraded
by human activities shall be rehabilitated for purposes in accord
with their natural potential and compatible with the well-being of
affected populations.
See also Rio Declaration,supra note 3, Principle 15.
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understood as articulations of certain historically contingent,12
-13
necessarily political and still-evolving moral relations.
Precaution,
understood in the context of environmental law, is a cultural
strategy 14 that accepts the imperfectness of human knowledge and
facilitates decisions that guard against easy anthropocentric
assumptions15 of redundancy in the natural environment. In
embracing scientific uncertainty
and related insecurities,
precautionary thinking identifies with a moral tradition that facilitates
decision-making by prioritizing experiential knowledge1 6 and moral

12. See, e.g., Peter Singer, Famine, Affluence, and Morality, 1 PHIL. & PUB.
229, 236-37 (1972), where, in discussing Urmson's "imperatives of duty,"
Singer writes, "Moral attitudes are shaped by the needs of society, and no doubt
society needs people who will observe the rules that make social existence
tolerable. From the point of view of a particular society, it is essential to prevent
violations of norms against killing, stealing, and so on. It is quite inessential,
however, to help people outside one's own society."
13. While many local cultures and societies have historically valued the natural
environment for its own sake, it is not difficult to accept that heightened global
awareness of environmental concerns is a recent trend. It was only in the 1980s and
1990s that states and international institutions undertook the task of ordering the
"global environment." See, e.g., Clark A. Miller, Climate Science and the Making
AFF.

of a Global Political Order, in STATES OF KNOWLEDGE: THE CO-PRODUCTION OF
SCIENCE AND SOCIAL ORDER 46 (Sheila Jasanoff ed., 2004).

14. "Cultural strategy" refers not only to meaning-making practices bound by
national or other group-affiliation, but also to the modernist culture/nature
dichotomy, which understands human society ("culture") as objectively
distinguishable from "nature." See, e.g., CLAUDE LtVI-STRAUSS, THE
ELEMENTARY STRUCTURES OF KINSHIP 3 (1969); BRUNO LATOUR, WE HAVE
NEVER BEEN MODERN (Catherine Porter trans., 1993).
15. "Anthropocentric assumptions" means the 19th century perspective of
viewing and capturing the "natural" as inferior and existing only to fulfill human
desires.
16. "Experiential knowledge" means to give priority viewing ecological
problems in terms of the experience of actors always already dwelling and working
on it. For instance, the forest, as people and animals know it, exists not only
because of the action of the elements, but also because it has been the dwelling and
site of labor for people, animals, insects, and plants over millennia. The forest,
accordingly, is not simply "land" (i.e., something quantitative, homogenous, and
controlled by legal title), nor can it be collapsed with nature or the environment.
Rather, the forest is a "landscape" (something qualitative, heterogeneous, and
opposed to a binary opposition between man and nature). See Tim Ingold, The
Temporality of the Landscape,25 WORLD ARCHAEOLOGY 152, 153-57 (1993).
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choice17 over a rationalistic valuation of ecological interests.18 By
contrast, contemporary legal practices read precaution as a natural
and objective strategy, thereby depoliticizing this articulation by
removing its historical context and moral basis, rendering it obvious 9
and automatically adaptable to the scheme of Sustainable
Development. 201 Precaution, as a relational-articulation, has no
internal logically formal rationality, 21 nor do I hold it to be
generalizeable across time and space.2 2 Quite to the contrary, I hold
17. The words "moral" and "ethical" are used interchangeably to describe
political decision-making involving choosing between diverse social bargains. But
such choices always include moments of self-sacrifice, as opposed to neutral ideas
of morality (satisfying equality, generality, and universality) or still narrower
claims involving "self interest, class interest, national interest or purely aesthetic
concerns." RICHARD W. MILLER, ANALYZING MARX 17 (1984).

18. For seminal critiques of cost-benefit analysis in this context, see generally
Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?-Toward Legal Rights for
Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450 (1972); Laurence H. Tribe, Ways Not to
Think about Plastic Trees: New Foundationsfor EnvironmentalLaw, 83 YALE L.J.

1315 (1974).
19. Accordingly, erstwhile critics like Bodansky have come around to compare
the Precautionary Principle to "proscriptions against murder and theft," arguing
that the logic of the precaution is inevitable. For Bodansky's critique of precaution,
see Daniel Bodansky, Scientific Uncertainty and the Precautionary Principle,
ENV'T, Sept. 1991, at 4, 5 [hereinafter Bodansky, Scientific Uncertainty] ("the

precautionary principle ... is too vague to serve as a regulatory standard because it
does not specify how much caution should be taken."). For Bodansky's subsequent
affirmation, see Bodansky, Deconstructing, supra note 8, at 381 ("[T]he
precautionary principle is difficult to argue with. Who would acknowledge that an
action they support is reckless? Who would prefer to be sorry than safe?").
20. See WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT,

OUR

COMMON FUTURE (1987), available at http://conspect.nl/pdf/Our Common
Future-Brundtland Report 1987.pdf [hereinafter BRUNDTLAND
COMMISSION
REPORT]; see also infra Part II; Rio Declaration,supra note 3, Principles 1, 4. For

a survey of Sustainable Development literature, see generally Alan Boyle & David
Freestone,

Introduction,

in

INTERNATIONAL

LAW

AND

SUSTAINABLE

DEVELOPMENT: PAST ACHIEVEMENTS AND FUTURE CHALLENGES 1, 1-18 (Allen

Boyle & David Freestone eds., 1999).
21. This move is akin to the fallacy involved in mistaking 'the things of logic
for the logic of things."' Pierre Bourdieu, Men and Machines, in ADVANCES IN
SOCIAL THEORY AND METHODOLOGY: TOWARD AN INTEGRATION OF MICRO- AND

MACRO-SOCIOLOGY 304, 305 (K. Knorr-Cetina & A. V. Cicourel eds., 1981).
22. What I have

described

as

a relational

articulation, above,

bears

a

resemblance to but is not synonymous with a more general safety-focused attitude
toward life. Marchant actually references the latter when reasoning, "Every risk
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the development, presentation, 23 and circulation of precaution to be
deeply personal, intensely moral, 24 and a product of certain historical
moments. 25 Stephen Dovers et al. put it eloquently, describing the
Precautionary Principle as "an attempt to institutionalize a value shift
in society . . . a moral injunction, reminding decision makers of this

societal expectation." 26
By presenting a thicker history of precautionary governance at
exemplary moments of ecological crisis, I trace the changing legal
and political interpretations of precaution and show that through the
19th and 20th centuries, policymakers developed this unique form of
governance in response to crises related to modernization. Lawyers
and policymakers who interpret precaution by subjecting it to the
politics of scientific verification and the goal of Sustainable
Development (as is the case with readings of the Precautionary
Principle) ignore this history to our shared detriment, because they
utilize an inert form of precautionary thinking incapable of
facilitating public decisions or investigating how modern risks are
generated and distributed. The result is that precaution no longer
articulates anything. To this extent, when we describe precaution as
"vague" or "democracy deficient," we are also acknowledging that
our contemporary interpretations of precaution, hinging on scientific
proof, do not adequately facilitate our desire to live sustainably. We
are saying that industrialization and techno-scientific advancement
continue to remain the shibboleth by which we measure and know a
involves some uncertainties, which must be bridged by precaution in making any
decision to reduce risk . .. few if any regulatory decisions could be taken in the
absence of precaution." Gary E. Marchant, From General Policy to Legal Rule:
Aspirations and Limitations of the PrecautionaryPrinciple, 111 ENVTL. HEALTH
PERSP. 1799, 1799 (2003).
23. See ULRICH BECK, RISK SOCIETY: TOWARDS A NEW MODERNITY 27 (Mark
Ritter trans., 1992) ("While such things as income and education are consumable
goods that can be experienced by the individual, the existence of and distribution of
risks and hazards are mediated on principle through argument.") (emphasis in
original).
24. See Stephen R. Dovers & John W. Handmer, Ignorance, the Precautionary
Principle, and Sustainability, 24 AMBIO 92, 94 (1995), available at http://
www.jstor.org/stable/4314302.
25. See, e.g., JEAN-FRANCOIS LYOTARD, THE DIFFEREND: PHRASES IN DISPUTE

32, W 47 (Georges Van Den Abbeele trans., 1989) ("Nothing can be said about
reality that does not presuppose it.").
26. Dovers & Handmer, supra note 24, at 94.
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political order to be democratic and progressive. This status quo
cannot be altered until precaution is mobilized not merely to stall
specific projects, but to inquire into the causes of modem risks and
bring into question a particular way of life that denies the iniquitous
side of economic and techno-scientific advancement. I am concerned,
therefore, not only with legal and political history, but also with
social perceptions of environmental risk, all of which underscore
human choice as the dominant factor in determining ecological
health.
Part I emphasizes how sustainability and precaution are not just
static concepts or determinative rules, but rather articulations of a
certain kind of relationship between "nature" and "culture." Part II
outlines the contemporary understanding of precaution as a part of
Sustainable Development, and sketches the implications of this
arrangement for precautionary action. Part III supplies a thicker
history of exemplary instances of precautionary management (from
Victorian England to post-war Germany, and 20th century
international disputes) to show that by relying exclusively on
positive, scientific knowledge, and "objective" expertise, decisionmakers have eroded their own ability to integrate precautionary
thinking into political decisions. Finally, in Part IV, I argue that by
denying the ethical underpinnings of precautionary governance,
environmental law not only fails to counter environmental
degradation, but also foregoes the possibility of interrogating
economic growth initiatives and complex technologies to determine
how risks are actually being created and distributed.
I. SUSTAINABILITY AND PRECAUTION AS RELATIONAL
ARTICULATIONS

Being "human" has long been understood in relation to animals,2 8
including regarding "behaving like an animal" as a pejorative.29 With
27. Contrast the insecurity surrounding the Precautionary Principle in
environmental law to the confidence with which states favor anticipatory strategies
against terrorism and similar, conventional threats to life. See, e.g., Trouwborst,
supra note 7, at 113 (providing a brief survey of literature on anticipatory selfdefense).
28. See Aaron Gross, Introduction and Overview: Animal Others and Animal
Studies, in ANIMALS AND HUMAN IMAGINATION: A COMPANION To ANIMAL
STUDIES 1 (Aaron Gross & Anne Vallely eds., 2012) ("Animals . . . are so deeply
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the Descartian mind/body dichotomy, however, this excision of
human society (or culture) from nature, and the ascendance of the
former over the latter, has been globalized as the ubiquitous frame for
Enlightenment-inspired knowledge of reality. 30 But not all societies
32
accepted this modern dichotomy equally31 or uncritically, and the
variance in attitudes has often coincided with how people relate to
their environment. 33 Moreover, a wealth of research has repeatedly
challenged the Descartian distinction 34 showing this taxonomy to be
based on purifications that are themselves historical artifacts with no
innate value35 that can be compared and objectively privileged as
transcendental theorizing requires.3 6 The value shift toward
precautionary and sustainable practices, on the other hand, interprets
human intervention as a process that is internal to the natural
enmeshed in human self-conception that if they did not exist we would need to
invent them."); see also JOHN BERGER, ABOUT LOOKING (1980).
29. See, e.g., JOSEPH CONRAD, HEART OF DARKNESS, in HEART OF DARKNESS
AND OTHER TALES (Cedric Watts ed., Oxford 2002) (1902); J. M. COETZEE,
WAITING FOR THE BARBARIANS (Penguin 1999) (1982).
30. See LATOUR, supra note 14.

31. See, e.g., Sheila Jasanoff, In a ConstitutionalMoment: Science and Social
Order at the Millennium, in SOCIAL STUDIES OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY:
LOOKING BACK, AHEAD 155, 163 (Bernward Joerges & Helga Nowotny eds.,

2003).
32. See BHIKHU PAREKH,

GANDHI'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: A CRITICAL

EXAMINATION 86 (1989).
33. See generally P. Wesley Schultz, Environmental Attitudes and Behaviors
across Cultures, in ONLINE READINGS IN PSYCHOLOGY AND CULTURE (2002),

http://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1070&context-orpc.
34. See CLAUDE LEVI-STRAUSS, The Science of the Concrete, in THE SAVAGE

MIND 9 (1966); LATOUR, supra note 14, at 1-5.

35. Of course claiming that the environment should be protected for its own
sake may be seen as perpetuating the nature/culture divide. But this purification
"while of no acceptable historical significance, does contain a logic, fully justifying
its use ...

as a methodological tool." LEVI-STRAUSS,

supra note 14, at 3. In

addition, maintaining this explicit position is important because human interests are
already well spoken for, and refusing to use categories like human or environment
would make for a confusing read. Needless to say, I do not expect that all readers
will accept such an opening position, nor should they. Nevertheless, the inability to
convince everyone is not a reason to adopt some "neutral" posture on such a
significant issue. See, e.g., MILLER, supra note 17, at 34-35.
36. See Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference: 'Structure, Sign and Play in
the Discourse of the Human Sciences', in JACQUES DERRIDA: BASIC WRITINGS

222-25 (Barry Stocker ed., 2007).
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environment (not as an external agent acting on a stable thing called
"the environment"). To this extent, precaution and sustainability are
cultural practices that reflect the continued muddling of a purified
context.37
Historically, such muddling becomes prominent in moments of
crisis. For instance, in West Germany, the conservative and
modernization-obsessed bent of post-WWII policies notwithstanding,
the recognition of "unprecedented threats to nature and human health
that accompanied 'economic miracles,"' 38 ushered in an era of
environmental conservation and activism. Environmental protection
groups and policymakers moved away from the impression that
"nature conservation was primarily a cultural affair involving the
protection natural monuments and scenic parts of the countryside-a
luxury concern suited for a future time of stability." 39 This attitudinal
shift spurred the subsequent disaggregation, in the 1970s, of Natur,40
to sieve out a special category, Umwelt, that specifically referenced
the physical aspects of nature (e.g., air and water). Umwelt, however,
was not a mere formal distillation. It denoted something stressed and
already facing irretrievable degradation41 and, therefore, in need of
the ethic of Vorsorge42 (widely held as the precursor to the
contemporary Precautionary Principle). Accordingly, German
policies refer not to the environment, but to Umweltschutz,
integrating the thing in danger with schutz, presenting the Umwelt as
37. O'Riordan & Jordan, supra note 10, at 208 ("[T]he once clear distinction
between environment, economy and society is becoming increasingly blurred.");
see also HARALD HOHMANN, PRECAUTIONARY LEGAL DUTIES AND PRINCIPLES OF
MODERN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 4-5 (1994); World Charter for
Nature, supra note 7, at pmbl. to Annex.
38. Sandra Chaney, ProtectingNature in a DividedNation: Conservation in the
Two Germanys, 1945-1972, in GERMANY'S NATURE: CULTURAL LANDSCAPES AND
ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY 207 (Thomas Lekan & Thomas Zeller eds., 2005).
39. Id. at 209.
40. See Boehmer-Christiansen, supra note 7, at 32.
41. See Andrew Jordan, Integrated Pollution Control and the Evolving Style
and Structure of Environmental Regulation in the UK, 2 ENVTL. POLITICS 405
(1993) (outlining the continuity between pro-active, precautionary measures and
the evolving culture of damage minimization in the United States and the United
Kingdom).
42. This is a complex concept that does not lend itself to a precise translation in
English. It may roughly be described as a caution that is mindful of the need to care
about the future. In Germany, it had strong ties to state regulations and planning.

See Boehmer-Christiansen, supra note 7, at 38-39.
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something always already under the state's protection. The resulting
approach to environmental governance was qualitatively different
and intervened prior to questions of liability or insurance because,
while these approaches represent the possibility of monetary
restitution,4 3 they come into effect only after the damage has been
done. Environmental governance emphasized intuition, assumed the
impossibility of absolute certainty, and importantly, recognized that
risks are inextricably tied to experience and anticipation.4 4 The
forward looking 45 character of precautionary action was identified as
the source of this strategy's positive power, and the resulting law,
Vorsorgeprinzip, was believed to supply "moral legitimation and
legal justification for activism." 46 In Germany, the Umweltschutz
embodied an evolving identification between human society and its
natural environment.
To be sincere to this identification between society and its
environment, sustainability and precaution should not be understood
as static things, laws, or even goals that can be quantified, bundled,
compared, and traded off against others. Rather, precaution and
sustainability should be understood as articulations of the everevolving relations between nature and culture-relations that are as
experiential 47 as they may go on to be jural. 4 8 It is no coincidence that
articulations like sustainability and precaution have developed at
43. See BECK, supra note 23, at 22 (arguing that nuclear power plants cannot be
privately insured because their risk is incalculable).
44. See, e.g., Official
Precautionary Principle,

References to and Acknowledgements of the
SCI. & UNCERTAINTY,
available at http://

www.uow.edu.au/~sharonb/STS300/science/regulation/articles/artprinciple2.html
(last visited Mar. 30, 2014) (quoting the Bergan Declaration) ("In order to achieve
sustainable development, policies must be based on the Precautionary Principle.
Environmental measures must anticipate, prevent and attack the causes of
environmental degradation. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible
damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for
postponing measures to prevent environmental degradation.").
45. O'Riordan & Jordan, supra note 10, at 196.
46. Boehmer-Christiansen, supra note 7, at 56; accord Sonja BoehmerChristiansen, Anglo-German Contrasts in Environmental Policy-Makingand Their
Impacts in the Case of Acid Rain Abatement, 4 INT'L ENVTL. AFF. 295 (1992); see
also infra PartIII.
47. See generally Ingold, supra note 16.

48. For the classic exposition on such distinctions, see
HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS
REASONING (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1964).
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moments in history when societies have, through experiences 49 of
species-annihilation level stress,5 0 doubted not only the integrity of
their separation from nature, but also the legacy of industrialization,
colonization,52 and subsequent structural inequities that have shaped
49. Ian Wills, The Environment,Information and the PrecautionaryPrinciple,4

51, 52 (1997) (attesting "faced with the possibility of environmental
changes that threaten humanity's life-support systems, a risk-averse society needs
to institutionalize caution by placing the burden of proof on those who wish to
change the environmental status quo . . . ."). Along similar lines, Tribe wagered
that "most of the crucial environmental choices confronting industrialized nations
in the last third of the 20th century will be choices that significantly shape and do
not merely implement those nations' values with respect to nature and wilderness."
Tribe, supra note 18, at 1324. A wealth of contemporary research appears to be on
his side.
50. See, e.g., CARSON, supra note 2, at 225. Much has already been written
affirming this proposition. By the 1990s, scholars had already catalogued the
development of a global consciousness acknowledging the vulnerability of global
eco-systems and displaying pessimism about the survival of humankind as a
primary amongst other species. See Riley E. Dunlap et al., Of Global Concern:
AGENDA

Results of the Health of the Planet Survey, ENV'T, Nov. 1993, at 7 [hereinafter

Gallup Poll] (providing an opinion poll conducted in the aftermath of the Rio
Conference on Environment and Development). A similar thesis may be found in
the graphical representation prepared by Norton, transposing "uncertainty,"
"vulnerability," and "resilience" in the context of Precaution. See Bryan Norton,
Sustainability, Human Welfare, and Ecosystem Health, 1 ENVTL. VALUES 97, 102

(1992).
51. Gilbert Rist describes the entry of ecological considerations into the
international plane as part of an ongoing "critique of industrial society." Gilbert
Rist, The Triumph of Third-Worldism, in THE HISTORY OF DEVELOPMENT: FROM
WESTERN ORIGINS To GLOBAL FAITH 140, 141 (Patrick Camiller trans., 1997); see
also WHAT Now: THE 1975 DAG HAMMARSKJOLD FOUNDATION REPORT 35-54
(1975), http://www.dhf.uu.se/pdffiler/75 what now.pdf.
52. See Rist, supra note 51, at 140-41, outlining a trajectory marked by the
Chinese Revolution (1967), the movement of May 1968 (in Paris), decolonization,
and first world solidarity with what were traditionally viewed as third world
concerns (including "the South African apartheid system, Portuguese colonialism
and White rule in Rhodesia, or the military dictatorships in Latin America"), the
dominance of Dependency theories of development, the unmasking of imperial
power in Vietnam, the development of different metrics for understanding the
environment (such as "limits to growth"), and finally the enactment of international
environmental protection treaties like the Declaration of the U.N. Conference on
the Human Environment. United Nations Conference on the Human Environment,
Stockholm, Swed., June 5-16, 1972, Declarationof the United Nations Conference

on the Human Environment, U.N.
Stockholm Declaration].
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global economic relations.53 Some commentators have attributed this
contemporary value shift to an anti-modern turn 54 in social relations.
But while the anti-modem turn is often marginalized as radical, there
is little doubt that, globally, citizens have become interested in
precautionary approaches to governance because of a growing
cultural awareness spurred by exposure to the reflexive nature of
modern risks.5 6 Ellen Hey describes this mainstreaming of an entirely
new set of values as involving
[A] shift away from the primacy of scientific proof and
traditional economic analyses that do not account for
environmental degradation. Instead, emphasis is placed on:
1) the vulnerability of the environment; 2) the limitations
of science to accurately predict threats to the environment,
and the measures required to prevent such threats; 3) the
availability of alternatives (both methods of production and
products) which permit the termination or minimization of
inputs into the environment; and 4) the need for long-term,
holistic economic considerations, accounting for, among
other things, environmental degradation and the costs of
waste treatment.
It seems peculiar, then, to regard precautionary thinking as valueneutral and empty 59 concepts accessible to all manner of interests. 60
53. See Rist, supra note 51, at 143-44; infra note 74 and accompanying text.
54. See Jilrgen Habermas, New Social Movements, TELOS, Sept. 21, 1981, at 33,
33.
55. See Klaus Eder, The Rise of Counter-Culture Movements against
Modernity: Nature as a New Fieldof Class Struggle, THEORY, CULTURE & Soc'Y,

Nov. 1990, at 21, 40-42.
56. See BECK, supra note 23, at 56 (describing how modem technologies

produce risks and the mechanisms to hedge against such risks, which in turn affect
the technology itself, spinning off into new risks and uncertainties that threaten the
environment, including humans); see also CHARLES PERROW, NORMAL
ACCIDENTS: LIVING WITH HIGH-RISK TECHNOLOGIES 304-53 (1999).
57. See Hey, supra note 8, at 305 (explaining how the "[a]doption of the
precautionary concept is part of a wider development in international
environmental law and policy.").
58. Id. at 308.
59. See Bodansky, Scientific Uncertainty,supra note 19, at 5.
60. See, e.g., Stockholm Declaration,supra note 52,
4, 6-7.
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Freestone recognizes this political partiality as a shift "in favour of a
bias towards safety and caution." 6 1 Of course, erasing the
nature/culture dichotomy and the accompanying lifestyles is not
simple nor an on/off position; moving toward sustainability requires
sacrifices, and what sacrifices a society deems worthwhile are
variable and speak to society's ambivalence about the value of
nature. Environmental groups appear to recognize this flux and
display a greater tolerance for heterogeneous beliefs and
commitments, both within and between various perspectives, than
other in-groups, like religious sects.6 2
How is it, then, that international treaties and judicial decisions
present the Precautionary Principle as a moral response attuned to
uncertainty, but routinely require that the actual application of
precautionary actions pre-qualify as universal, objective, and
otherwise scientifically confirmed? In surveying scholarship on
Sustainable Development and precautionary action, three impressions
are telling: first, the goal of environmental protection is generalized
within the larger ambit of economic governance; second, attempts at
incorporating a precautionary analysis of a situation hinge on the
character and acceptability of pre-existing scientific knowledge, even
though normative and doctrinal descriptions of the Precautionary
Principle, consistently accept precaution as applicable beyond the
reach of scientific certainty;63 and third, how the Precautionary

61. David Freestone, The Road from Rio: International Environmental Law
after the Earth Summit, 6 J. ENVTL. L. 193, 211 (1994) (emphasis added).
62. Robert A. Stallings, Patternsof Belief in Social Movements: Clarifications
from an Analysis ofEnvironmental Groups, 14 Soc. Q. 465, 477 (1973).

63. O'Riordan & Jordan present a standard rendering of this position, writing:
The rules of thumb [in deciding when/how to apply precaution],
however, are to err on the side of caution, and the challenge is to
provide reasoned scientific evidence to justify a higher than
expected cost. This is by no means straightforward, as the legal
profession tends to look for the 'certainties' of science as a guide,
and may become exasperated when the evidence is uncertain via
either ignorance or interdeterminacy.
O'Riordan & Jordan, supra note 10, at 206.
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Principle influences our interest in inquiring into the production of
risk. 64 Parts II, III, and IV elaborate on these impressions.
II. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION WITHIN THE LARGER AMBIT OF
ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE

Since the 1980s, the concept of Sustainable Development has been
integrated into myriad legal instruments65 and has become a
touchstone for environmental interventions. But despite Sustainable
Development's grounding in protective, environmentally-conscious
thinking, as Andrew Jordan and Timothy O'Riordan note, this
concept has been "dangerously successful" because of the "uncritical
accumulation of meanings, often contradictory and impractical, that
have characterised [sic]" its globalization. 6 6 There is little doubt that
sustainability is the way forward, but as a policy framework
Sustainable Development should not be understood as self-justifying
nor accountable only to its own internal logic. While a thorough
67
discussion is certainly beyond the scope of my argument, a modest
exploration of the Sustainable Development is necessary to describe
how an uncritical acceptance of this concept deadens precautionary
thinking (expressed as the Precautionary Principle).
A. A CriticalIntroduction to SustainableDevelopment

The crux of Sustainable Development is that while socio-economic
development cannot be ceased, it must be curtailed to allow longterm growth and prosperity. Scholars have also acknowledged that "a
buzzword such as 'sustainability' has a long history of power and

64. See Bodansky, Deconstructing, supra note 8, at 381-91; Marchant, supra

note 22, at 1800.
65. See, e.g., Rio Declaration, supra note 3; BRUNDTLAND
20; Communication, supra note 5.

COMMISSION

REPORT, supra note

66. O'Riordan & Jordan, supra note 10, at 192. For an account of the confusing
ways in which the Indian Supreme Court has adopted Sustainable Development,
see Saptarishi Bandopadhyay, Because the Cart Situates the Horse: Unrecognized
Movements Underlying the Indian Supreme Court's InternalizationofInternational
EnvironmentalLaw, 50 INDIAN J. INT'L. L. 204, 226-27, 241-46 (2010), available

at http://works.bepress.com/saptarishi bandopadhyay/2.
67. Works deconstructing sustainability in greater detail may be found in the
footnotes that follow.
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exclusion" 68 In keeping with the themes thus far explored, we might
begin by asking: what kinds of sacrifices does Sustainable
Development foresee?
In 1987 the Brundtland Commission Report proposed that:
Humanity has the ability to make development sustainable
to ensure that it meets the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their
own needs. The concept of sustainable development does
imply limits-not absolute limits but limitations imposed
by the present state of technology and social organization
on environmental resources and by the ability of the
biosphere to absorb the effects of human activities. But
technology and social organization can be both managed
and improved to make way for a new era of economic
growth.69
From this introduction into international environmental law,
"sustainable" has remained a qualifier on the actual subject of
Sustainable Development: development understood as economic
growth. A narrow but plausible reading of this definition could
conclude that it is acceptable for humans to destroy life forms and
entire ecosystems globally, 70 so long as they do not irreversibly
endanger the fulfillment of human needs as they may be determined
in the future. To paraphrase roughly: humans can do more to help
68. The Nature of German Environmental History, 27 GERMAN HIST. 113

(2009).
69. BRUNDTLAND COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 20, at 15, § 3: 27.
70. See LESTER R. BROWN, Eco-EcoNoMY 77 (2001) (noting

that
environmental impact assessments are largely about ameliorating environmental
damage rather than preventing it because such assessments are only performed
after economists and policymakers have decided what investments to make).
71. By 1992 when the Rio Declaration came into being, the focus of
negotiations had shifted from the "Human Environment" (at the 1972 Stockholm
Declaration) to "Environment and Development," (at the Rio Declaration).
Principle 1 of the Rio Declaration explicitly places human concerns at the center or
environmental issues, while Principle 4 reads, "In order to achieve sustainable
development, environmental protection shall constitute an integral part of the
development process and cannot be considered in isolation from it." Rio
Declaration,supra note 3; see also ARNE NAESS, ECOLOGY OF WISDOM 297 (Alan
Drengson & Bill Devall eds., 2008).
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keep the planet sustainable for humans which means making sure
humans get what they need today without risking what humans may
need tomorrow. "Limits," on the other hand, the Brundtland
Commission Report clarifies, are not absolute but constructed by the
interaction of the "present state of technology and social organization
on environmental resources" and "the ability of the biosphere to
absorb the effects of human activities."72 The report continues by
affirming the goal of achieving economic growth through
technological innovation, but leaves ambiguous the relationship
between these future technologies and the environment. Similarly,
the Rio Declaration requires that environmental protection be an
"integral component of sustainable development, "73 and not the other
way around. Over time, the frame called Sustainable Development
absorbs all environmental concerns into its calculus of economic
growth, thereby making ecological choices dependant on the
economic ones.74 For this reason, we can only ever understand a
government's ability to take precautionary action in terms of its
effect on economic growth internationally.

§ 3: 27
73. Rio Declaration,supra note 3, § 16.20.
74. A rough parallel is found in the history of international economic
development with respect to the New International Economic Order, an economic
72. BRUNDTLAND COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 20, at 15,

arrangement whose aim, Rist writes, "was to realize a long-standing dream of
world capitalism ... to ensure continuing growth of the system as a whole by better
integrating the peripheral countries ... the countries of the North were asked to

make concessions ... but this also meant that the key to the South's 'development'
lay in the North." Rist, supra note 51, at 150 (emphasis in original).
75. See, e.g., Boyle & Freestone, supra note 20, at 9. The Australian National
Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable Development has adopted the precaution as a
"guiding principle" of sustainable development. See Ecologically Sustainable Dev.
Steering Comm., National Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable Development,

(1992), http://www.environment.gov.au/
resource/national-strategy-ecologically-sustainable-development. A similar posture
is maintained by the Indian Supreme Court. See Bandopadhyay, supra note 66.
AUSTRALIAN Gov'T DEPT. OF THE ENV'T
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B. PrecautionaryRelations within the Narrativeof Sustainable
Development
"In its more tempered versions, the [Precautionary]principle is
indistinguishablefrom cost-benefit analysis with risk aversion
assumed. ,76

Throughout the 20th century, with the rising popularity of ecogovernance, monikers such as "integrated outcome"77 have conveyed
the faith in a natural compatibility between environmental protection
and economic growth. This rubric, in turn, affirmed the trend of
organizing biologicals (with the human body as a primary focus) in
relation to their compatibility with economic goals and standardized
techno-scientific practices. For Luke, this critical moment is
marked by the ability and willingness of human societies to
''consciously . . . wager their life as a species on the products of their
biopolitical strategies and technological systems . . . ."79 But because
organizing the world as the "Global Environment"80 was inextricably
tied to economic growth and technological advancement, human
societies realized that they were "also wagering the lives of other, or
all, species."81 These parallel realizations make up the tense narrative
that has globalized as Sustainable Development.
Initially, to affirm the presumed natural harmony between human
economic goals and ecological health, it was the earth's carrying

A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE 138 (2004).
77. See Michael Kerr & Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger, Corporate Social
76. RICHARD

Responsibility: International Strategies and Regimes, in SUSTAINABLE JUSTICE:
RECONCILING ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

134, 134-35 (Marie-

Claire Cordonier Segger & C. G. Weeramantry eds., 2005).
78. See Timothy W. Luke, Sustainable Development as a Power/Knowledge
System: The Problem of 'Governmentality', in GREENING ENVIRONMENTAL

26 (Frank Fischer & Michael
Black eds., 1995) ("Once human power/knowledge formations become the
foundation of industrial society's economic development, they also become a major
factor in all terrestrial life-forms' continued physical survival."); see also infra Part
III.
79. Id. at 26.
POLICY: THE POLITICS OF A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE

80. See Isabelle Lanthier & Lawrence Olivier, The Construction of
Environmental 'Awareness',in DISCOURSES OF THE ENVIRONMENT 63 (Eric Darier

ed., 1999); see also Miller, supra note 13, at 66.
81. Luke, supra note 78, at 26.
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capacity (Assimilative Capacity) 82 that was deemed reconcilable.
Later, eco-management was characterized by Prevention.83 More
recently, however, environmental degradation and the multiplication
of risks have forced a reckoning with historic assumptions about the
nature/culture relationship-nurturing an emphasis on precautionary
action. For this reason, any meaningful use of precautionary thinking
requires that Sustainable Development be interpreted to prioritize
commitment and self-sacrifice, instead of settling for the assumption
that environmental protection and economic growth are objectively
reconcilable. 84 Otherwise, Sustainable Development continues to
mirror the status quo in environmental governance before that term
was coined.
The compatibility assumption views a precautionary approach as
an exception and not the norm-precautionary challenges are deemed
unnecessary or even irrelevant until scientific evidence confirms
otherwise. Through this reconciliatory methodology human
interventions into the environment can be "scientifically" ordered to
the point where potentially unsustainable activities can be made (i.e.,
deemed) sustainable.85 For obvious reasons, the have-your-cake-andeat-it-too draw of Sustainable Development (promoting forms of
sustainability and precaution that don't get in the way of existing
human lifestyles) is so strong that even O'Riordan and Jordan,
sophisticated advocates of precautionary management, 86 have come
to view the possibilities thus:
82. See, e.g., Stockholm Declaration,supra note 52, at Principle 6 (prescribing

that only when pollution was such as to overwhelm the restorative or assimilative
capabilities of the environment can action be taken in opposition to a given
activity).
83. See SANDS, supra note 3, at 246-49; see also MAURICE SUNKIN ET AL.,
SOURCEBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 73 (2nd ed., 2001) (providing a different
reading from Sands, on whether the prominent language of Principle 21 of the
Stockholm Declaration is indeed preventative in character).
84. See Rio Declaration,supra note 3, Principle 12 ("States should cooperate to
promote a supportive and open international economic system that would lead to
economic growth and sustainable development in all countries, to better address the
problems of environmental degradation.").
85. See infra PartIII; see, e.g., O'Riordan & Jordan, supra note 10, at 193.
86. Norton has called for "a set of principles, derived from a plausible core idea
of sustainability, but sufficiently specific to provide significant guidance in day-today decisions. . . ." Norton, supra note 50, at 98. In response, Timothy O'Riordan
and Andrew Jordan nominate "[p]recaution." See O'Riordan & Jordan, supra note
10, at 193.
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This [precautionary principle] is still a vague notion, but it
suggests a compatibility between the evolution of a postindustrialist value drift, and the opportunities afforded by
information technology and increasingly flexible industrial
culture towards a more inherent compatibility of high
environmental quality with economic growth.
By contrast, I would suggest that any such "compatibility" be
understood as a policy-of-finding-compatibility,
or a cultural
rationalization. 89 Whether something is sustainable is not a matter of
pure discovery; it involves a series of moral and political choices that
certify resulting policies as being sustainable. 90 Accordingly, if
policy-makers have already determined an activity as being
unsustainable, say, a chemical disposal facility in the middle of a
petting zoo (endangering both animals and humans), there is little
need to classify the resulting prohibition as precautionary. In this
scheme, therefore, precaution becomes a serious part of the
conversation only after we are scientifically self-aware of uncertainty
and acknowledge the same. On the other hand, if, as O'Riordan and
Jordan describe it, precaution does not exist as suspicious of
economic growth and but instead represents some naturally
conciliatory possibility, then, because things can always be found to
be sustainable, precaution is meaningless. Already, precautionary
87. O'Riordan & Jordan, supra note 10, at 193.
88. Luke, supra note 78, at 22-23 (arguing that even though Sustainable
Development has emerged as a "response to the globalistic perspectives of the
'limits to growth' phenomenon ... Sustainable Development often does little more
than assume that the limits to growth might be far more flexible.").
89. See also Duncan Kennedy, The Role of Law in Economic Thought: Essays
on the Fetishism of Commodities, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 939, 969-70 (1985) ("People

understand much that is really the product of social decision to flow ineluctably
from the physical [i.e., natural] properties of objects.").
90. A parallel strategy can be identified in the field of "development," where
the second generation of national reforms recommended by the World Bank and
the IMF appear to incorporate "social" objectives but without any significant reevaluation. Instead social objectives are without friction assumed, or otherwise
made compatible with Washington-Consensus style concerns. See, e.g., Kerry
Rittich, The Future of Law and Development: Second-GenerationReforms and the
Incorporation of the Social, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A
CRITICAL APPRAISAL

2006).

203, 205-06, 218 (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds.,
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action is excluded from investigations of sustainability unless and
until such challenges are accompanied by quantifiable scientific
evidence proving either present ignorance or future risk-effectively
a rebuttable presumption against precautionary actions.
Precautionary thinking, while prominently featured within the
rhetoric of Sustainable Development, 9 1 is not recognized as an ethical
relation that can test sustainability claims. Instead, the idea of a
precautionary relationship is depoliticized and upheld as a valueneutral, rhetorical trope that, in the absence of objective scientific
evidence, affords virtually endless possibilities of natural coherence
between the need for environmental protection, and economic growth
and techno-scientific advancement. 92 The underlying illusion, of
course, is that sustainability choices are somehow indeterminate and
do not always involve winners and losers. However, as we will see,
the uneasy truce falls apart when precautionary regulations are
pressed against claims of sustainability-precautionary actions that
get in the way of economic development are often automatically held
to symbolize the freezing of human advancement and freedom,
promising a future full of losers.
My conclusions here are not without precedent in the history of
environmental regulation. Sandra Chaney, for instance, describes
how in 1960s Germany, environmental protection groups "adapted
their discourse to larger public debates of the postwar period,
promising to aid in economic revival and democratic renewal." 93
Even a cursory review of strategies undertaken by environmental
movements in the recent past will bear out how this ordering of
activism continues to repeat. The productive power of law can be
seen in how a particular strategy or nomenclature (and the resulting
self-perception) may be developed in order for a stakeholder or

91. See Daniel Dobos, Note, The Necessity of Precaution: The Future of
Ecological Necessity and the PrecautionaryPrinciple, 13 FORDHAM INT'L. L.J.

375, 394 (2002).
92. SHEILA JASANOFF, DESIGNS ON NATURE: SCIENCE AND DEMOCRACY IN
EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 265-66 (2005) ("As risk assessment became the
preferred method for making regulatory judgments appear objective, so too it

gradually took on the mantle of science. . . . U.S. National Research Council ...
[defined] ... risk assessment as a largely scientific component of regulatory
decision making that should precede, and be separated from, value judgments ...
considered appropriate only at the later stage of 'risk management.').
93. See Chaney, supra note 38, at 210.
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activist to be taken seriously; concessions made under situations of
long-term constraint may re-make the activist himself as well as
public perception of the activity at large. 94 Consider how a
conservationist's mandate differs from that of a humane society: 95
while the latter may be accused of humanizing beings considered
"non-human" (which, anti-slavery efforts show to be crucial), the
conservationist conserves things for society to consume or otherwise
enjoy. The "greatest number" within the utilitarian formula of
"greatest good for the greatest number" rarely includes non-humans.
Aside from labeling precautionary arguments as bad for the
economy, neutering the precautionary relationship allows for an
endless deferring of political decision in favor of scientific certainty.
And until this unlikely frontier is reached, Sustainable Development
is pursued through a balancing mechanism called "proportionality
analysis." 96 Precaution becomes one trope amongst many, no more
capable of realizing sustainability relations than the probabilistic
scientific data to which precautionary actions are now obliged.
One further conclusion, then, may be carried forward: when
environmental activists convey environmental interests in economic
terms so that they may be favorably received by policy/decisionmakers, their efforts are strategic, practical and ultimately political in
nature. Be it aggressive ideological struggle, capitulation or
compromise, so long as values differ and ambivalence remains,
strategies and decisions surrounding the nature/culture divide remain
inextricably political.
I am not advocating that work toward sustainability be abandoned;
I am only pointing out that claims to objective or scientific truth
cannot by themselves absolve decision-makers of the need to decide
in ways that actually respond to people's experiences of the world
around them. Sustainable Development is no more self-correcting
than, say, the market or the economy, and therefore must be tested by
94. As Christopher Stone has noted, in hearing traditional conservationist
arguments, "[o]ne feels that the arguments lack even their proponent's convictions.
I expect they want to say something less egotistic and more emphatic but the
prevailing and sanctioned modes of explanation in our society are not quite ready
for it." Stone, supra note 18, at 490.
95. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 8, at 463. For a critical overview of the
development of humane societies, see IAN HACKING, REWRITING THE SOUL 55-68
(1995).
96. See infra Part II.C.
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a reckoning for which it cannot itself set the terms. Precautionary
relations presuppose a society that acknowledges the need for
decisive action that is part scientific knowledge, part an instinct for
safety, and part a leap of faith guided by equity, and the desire to
preserve aspects of reality that science does not find necessarily
useful. Precautionary decision is a radicalization of humdrum,
seemingly automatic environmental choices, and tests the goal of
Sustainable Development instead of being absorbed by it.
In Parts II.C, III and IV, I review: the rationalizing tendency at the
heart of Sustainable Development claims (deemed to reflect some
natural characteristic of environmental resilience); 97 the notion that
the "right answer" on sustainability can be determined through
scientific rigor (a flawed assumption previously applied through
"assimilative capacity" identifications); 98 and finally, that such
97. Proponents of Sustainable Development are prone to falling into arguments
based on "naturalistic fallacy," that asks humans to "adopt new values and new sets
of conduct" by conflating nature (i.e., the natural) with morality (i.e., the social),
and reading them both as "natural." See tric Darier, Foucault against
EnvironmentalEthics, in DISCOURSES OF THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 80, at 215.

This objection is not an abdication of the independent interests of non-humans, but
a rejection of nature as a storehouse of indicators that can be read as lifedetermining truths.
98. Consider how the shift in scientific standards of environmental assessment
from the "assimilative capacity principle" to the "preventive" or "preventative"
principle, down to "precaution." Explaining this shift, Trouwborst (referencing
Bodansky's comparable conception) writes, "It is to a great extent the failure of the
assimilative capacity approach-with the absence of predictions by science of
certain major impacts and scientific proof of detrimental effects coming too latethat led, on a sector-by-sector basis, to the adoption of the precautionary principle
in international law. . . ." TROUWBORST, supra note 8, at 19. Other commentators
provide a similar explanation: that the Precautionary Principle "has arisen from the
realization that the old permissive approach based on the assumed assimilative
capacity of the environment has failed... ." Id. (quoting Stairs & Taylor)
(emphasis added). Such descriptions incorporate a few commonly held notions:
First, we find the move from the "Assimilative Capacity" principle, to the
"Prevention" or "Preventative" principle to the contemporary Precautionary
Principle, depicted as progressive and increasingly sophisticated. Second, the
acceptance assumption is seen as evidence of this "philosophical shift," Trouwborst
references Article 3(f) of the Convention on the Ban of Import into Africa and the
Control of Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes
Within Africa, Jan. 30, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 775, which reads: "The Parties shall
cooperate with each other in taking the appropriate measures to implement the
precautionary principle to pollution prevention through the application of clean
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rationalistic, cost-benefit evaluations can nurture a democratic culture
that values the environment as more than a bundle of resources.
C. Running with ProportionalityScissors

Popularly understood as the balancing of competing interests,
proportionality analysis requires the decision-maker to weigh
conflicting interests and rationally prioritize them by appealing to
some superseding norm. With a standard such as reasonableness, the
jurist's strategy would involve comparing the actions of one party
and the expectations of another against a fictitious reasonable man. In
proportionality analysis, by contrast, the jurist appears to arrive at an
production methods, rather than the pursuit of a permissible emissions approach
based on assimilative capacity assumptions." So is it really true that the science of
yesterday (held to be objective and rational in its time) has since been found to be
mere assumption? The value of standardized scientific evidence grows even more
doubtful when we encounter 0' Riordan & Jordan arguing: "[H]umans must learn
to widen the assimilative capacity of natural systems by deliberately 'holding back'
from unnecessary and environmentally unsustainable resource use on the grounds
that exploitation may prove to be counterproductive, excessively costly or unfair to
future generations." O'Riordan and Jordan, supra note 10, at 194. On this occasion,
an assumption has been transformed into something that can be shaped (widened)
through planning. O'Riordan and Jordan's description also displays another
maneuver-in expressing precaution in terms of avoiding future problems, the
authors also simultaneously fold into this calculus the distant future usually
described through the rhetoric of intergenerational equity. Ironically, such
descriptions themselves take a lot of the uncertainty out of the unknown, i.e.,
science, rationality, and governance are shown as heavily stable and growing
progressively sophisticated. This process of owning the knowledge-bases that
shape environmental policy, however, is not new and works as a double-edged
sword given its tendency to essentialize and stabilize that which is inessential and
unstable. Urlich Beck addresses this downside, writing: "The observable
consequence is that critics [i.e., environmentalism] frequently argue more
scientifically than the natural scientists they dispute against . . . [but] fall prey to a
naive realism about definitions of the dangers one consumes. On the one hand, this
naive realism of hazards is (apparently) necessary as an expression of outrage and a
motor of protest; on the other it is its Achilles' heel." ULRICH BECK, ECOLOGICAL
POLITICS IN AN AGE OF RISK 60 (1995). Finally, such descriptions describe a trend
where a party interested in using the Precautionary Principle must first prove the
uncertainty of risk with scientific sophistication-as O'Riordan and Jordan put it:
"This [erring on the side of caution] is by no means straightforward, as the legal
profession tends to look for the 'certainties' of science as a guide, and may become
exasperated when the evidence is uncertain via either ignorance or
interdeterminacy." O'Riordan & Jordan, supra note 10, at 206.
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appropriate norm that supersedes the arguments marshaled by the
litigants (like finding the right pair of glasses to view the dispute) by
weighing the opposing interests99 and underlying claims. However, in
order for the balancing process to appear to reflect some rational
coherence, there can be no sharp edges, no fundamental
disagreements between the competing interests, only a number of
differences awaiting a logical reconciliation by the jurist.100 In
addition, balancing involves "choosing a norm (not choosing a
winning party) among a number of permissible alternatives on the
ground that it best balances or combines conflicting normative
considerations . . . ."; accordingly, each alternative is surveyed until

the jurist finds its limit, "beyond which we enter the domain of an
exception, or of another norm."101
But underlying any such process of testing is an implied
acceptance of a particular set of moral choices over possible others.
This is clearly found to be the case, for instance, when security
against asbestos exposure is balanced away in favor of economic
advantages (including those involving securing livelihoods).102 At
this level of analysis, proportionality appears not very different from
an exercise in preferring one interest to another. Pierre Schlag
explains the underlying logic:
The fact that we have thought about these particular
preferences [i.e., the conflicting choices] a lot, and that
they matter to us even more, does not suffice to transform
them into something else.
99. Duncan Kennedy, A TransnationalGenealogy ofProportionalityin Private
Law, in THE FOUNDATIONS

OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE

LAW 185,

193 (Roger

Brownsword et al. eds., 2011) (In proportionality, "the jurist chooses a norm by
balancing, in [reasonableness]; ... it is the norm itself whose application requires
balancing.").
100. See, e.g., Communication, supra note 5, § 6.3.1; see also David P. Currie,
Air Pollution Control in West Germany, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 355, 359 nn.30-35

(1982).
101. Kennedy, supra note 99, at 190.
102. See, e.g., Research Found. for Sci. Tech. Nat'l Res. Policy v. Union of India
(Blue Lady), 2007 S.C.A.L.E. 75 (India) (using proportionality analysis to allow
the dismantling of a ship laden with asbestos in order to sustain the local shipbreaking economy); see also Florent Pelsy, Comment, The Blue Lady Case and the
International Issue of Ship Dismantling, 4 L. ENV'T & DEV. J. 135 (2008),

available at http://www.lead-journal.org/content/08135.pdf.
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Not only is it always possible to give reasons, but it is
always possible to affirm that the reasons given are (really)
good ones. This only pushes reason giving back another
level: Why are these reasons (really) good ones? One can
imagine here the unfolding of an infinite regress ....
The fields of American law are constituted by doctrine
regulating doctrine regulating doctrine (and so on) . . . .
Many legal thinkers and actors give up way before that
point is reached. They check out ....
Still, if one pursues the grounds of a balancing decision
with sufficient Socratic persistence, one will . . . reach a
point where reason seems to run out . .. [for instance,] one

can acknowledge that freedom of speech is central to
constitutional democracy, yet continue to wonder why and
how it is more central than equal protection.
And so if one pursues the grounds of a balancing decision
with sufficient Socratic persistence, one will reach a
declarative affirmation that is proffered as the authoritative
and self-evident truth. 103
Proportionality is applied when other more discreet (or normal)
modes of resolution prove unsuccessful. In portraying economic
growth as compatible with environmental protection, the frame of
Sustainable Development preemptively dulls the impact of existing
dialectics (e.g., humanism v. capitalism, fairness v. efficiency,
emotional value v. utilitarianism), 104- and lowers their significance by
replacing them with demure, limited technical oppositions10 5 (say,
job-creation/economic growth v. community healthcare concerns). 106

103. PIERRE SCHLAG, THE ENCHANTMENT OF REASON 32-33 (1998).

104. O'Riordan & Jordan, supra note 10, at 209.
105. This move is certainly not novel and has been identified by others, including
Claude Levi-Strauss in his observation that two abjectly divided positions can
sometimes be mediated between by replacing them with a pair that represents more
reconcilable terms. See Claude Levi-Strauss, The Structural Study of Myth, in
STRUCTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 206, 224 (Claire Jacobson & Brooke Shoepf trans.,

1963). For a discussion of how such a move is performed within legal argument,
see Duncan Kennedy, A Semiotics of Legal Argument, 42 SYRACUSE L. REV. 75,
105-16 (1991).
106. See Pelsy, supra note 102, at 140-45.
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But even such oppositions are not suspended in the ether. They arise
from within the dialectics that proportionality analysis avoids. Jim
Dratwa substantiates this observation when, in describing the
constitutionalizing function of precaution within the European Union,
he writes:
[T]o constitutionalize is to strive for a distribution of
competences, as exemplified in the EU by debates over the
desirability of a clear catalogue of competences. Such a
division of labour requires the balancing of competing
values, or the hierarchical ordering of competing
organizing principles. This can mean placing law, or the
rule of law, above politics. It can mean, in the case of
constitutionalism at the WTO for example, placing free
trade above social and environmental concerns. And it can
mean, in the context of the EU, placing some concerns
about human health, safety, and the environment above
trade, albeit not above the single market. 107
Such a constructed sense of equity and mutuality is not new to the
law,108 and in addition to the implied socialization, the decisionmaker can readily rationalize away their choice of frame. For
instance, critics of the Indian Supreme Court's decision in the
Research Found.for Sci. Tech. Nat'1 Res. Policy v. Union of India
(Blue Lady) have argued that Sustainable Development has a rational
narrative reflected in a "genuine" definition that the Court "distorted"
107. Jim Dratwa, Representing Europe with the Precautionary Principle, in
Bio CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE GENETIC AGE 263, 272-73
(Sheila Jasanoff ed., 2011).
108. See David Delaney, Making Nature/Marking Humans: Law as a Site of
(Cultural) Production, 91 ANNALS Ass'N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 487, 500 (2001),
available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/3651284 ("The arts of argument include, of
course, the drawing of lines and distinctions, but they also include the making of
connections by analogy, metaphor, and recategorization. The arts of persuasion
create connections in the service of both reinforcing dominant visions of reality and
crafting alternative visions. In the language of law, this art is practiced with the
malleable tools inherited from liberalism. Among the more significant of these
tools is the notion of rights: rights as shield, rights as sword, rights as signifier of
mutuality. Not for nothing is so much of the politics of nature cast in arguments
about rights: prisoners' rights, women's rights, animal rights, children's
rights, even the rights of nature.").
REFRAMING RIGHTS:
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and "diluted." 109 Accepting the norm of Sustainable Development,
but rejecting the result when the decision-maker's interpretations
conflicts with one's own, 110 is ultimately an unconvincing kind of
"internal skepticism.""' One could conceivably inquire as to why the
judges chose to proceed with a proportionality-based interpretation
with respect to the Blue Lady, when in previous decisions the Court
has used principles like reasonableness,1 12 or "equity,"1 1 3 amongst
others,114 to read precaution and sustainability. But even such a
critique would likely be thwarted, because proportionality analysis
traditionally internalizes criticisms leveled against itself; so, for
instance, judicial use of proportionality often frames doubts about the
decision-maker's approach (e.g., whether or not proportionality
analysis is the correct approach in a given dispute), as questions that
themselves need to be balanced. 1 5 Ultimately, only a pair of weak
strategies emerge to test sustainability findings: norm acceptance
followed by internal skepticism, or inquiring into the consistency of
norm-finding-a tact that judges and decision-makers expect and are
prepared to parry. 116 The resulting status quo is exemplified in post109. See Pelsy, supra note 102, at 141-42, 147.
110. See Shiv Visvanathan, Supreme Court Constructs a Dam, EcoN. & POL.
WKLY., Nov. 25, 2000, at 4176.
111. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 78-79 (1986).
112. See A.P. Pollution Control Bd. v. Prof. M.V. Nayudu (Retd.) and Ors.,
A.I.R. 1999 S.C. 812 (India) (relying on a municipal decision in New Zealand in
reasoning that the Precautionary Principle should only be applied in the public
interest "according to a 'reasonable persons' test.").
113. See, e.g., Karnataka Indus. Areas Dev. Bd. v. Sri. C. Kenchappa & Ors.,
A.I.R. 2006 S.C. 2038, 23 (India) ("The right to development must be fulfilled so
as to equitably meet developmental and environmental needs of present and future
generations.") (citing Rio Declaration,supra note 3, Principle 3); see also Bombay
Dyeing & Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Bombay Envtl. Action Grp. & Ors., A.I.R. 2006 S.C.
1489,
48-49; S. Jagannath v. Union of India & Ors., A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 811, 14
("Sustainable development of shrimp aquaculture should be guided by the
principles of social equity, nutritional security, environmental protection and
economic development with a holistic approach to achieve long-term benefits.").
114. See Karnataka,A.I.R. 2006 S.C. 28.
115. See Kennedy, supra note 99, at 190 ("An important moment in the history
of balancing ... occurred when the procedure was reformulated to include
considerations of administrability ... that judicial usurpation is a danger [that
should itself be balanced] ... balancers engulf their critics by incorporating their
objections into the calculus.").
116. See Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical
Phenomenology, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 518 (1986).
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WWII West Germany, where successive governments, upon
accepting a natural coherence between sustainability and industrial
modernization (thereby placing their modernization policies beyond
challenge), strategically opted in and out of precautionary strategies,
eventually producing laws that, far from being precautionary,
represented the interests of groups holding surplus political
influence.
More generally, courts using proportionality analysis
have reached starkly similar political ends without risking their
legitimacy. As a consequence, however successful a challenge to
Sustainable Development (usually the appropriate superseding norm)
may be, such oppositions always serve to strengthen and normalize
the myth of proportionality1 l 9 as the only rational and reasonable way
toward sustainable environmental solutions.
The idea of Sustainable Development thrives under the assumption
that political decisions need not be hard, win-lose choices. And such
a construct robs Sustainable Development of its ethical basis. Instead,
we labor under the belief that if we weigh the issues hard enough and
for long enough, we can arrive at a meaningful reconciliatory norm.
This is where the image of "sustainable," as conveyed by Sustainable
Development, differs from that assumed under a precautionaryrelationship. Given fundamental value conflicts, at the moment of
decision, precaution allows for a non-rational commitment in favor of
environmental protection premised on the acceptance of uncertainty.
On the other hand, because Sustainable Development is presented as
evidence-based, the legitimacy of political decisions must hinge on
the provision of adequate proof of harm. Consequently, instead of
understanding the precautionary-relation as promoting a cooperative
and decisionist ethic, conflicting interest-groups become obliged to
compete to produce more and better scientific evidence to tilt the
117. This need not result from political strategizing. For instance, as Ronnie
Harding and Liz Fisher argue, when precaution becomes ubiquitous, further
instances of precautionary action mean little since the existing measures and
operations are deemed to already be "precautionary." See Ronnie Harding & Liz
Fisher, The Precautionary Principle in Australia, in INTERPRETING THE
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE, supra note 7, at 259.
118. See Kennedy, supra note 99, at 187 (describing proportionality analysis as
representing "the simultaneous de-rationalisation [sic] and politicisation [sic] of
legal technique.").
119. Against this mythologization, Kennedy suggests that we "interpret it
[proportionality] in a Weberian way, as disenchantment, as the belated attainment
of legal maturity." Id. at 187.
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balance in their favor. And this process is certified by the assumption
that the moment of decision can be stayed until an objective
reconciliation can settle the contest.
But aside from the immediate repercussions of a particular dispute,
the idea of Sustainable Development, when mythologized,
encourages a political culture that trusts scientific knowledge as
amoral and apolitical. Uncritical acceptance of expert-led decisionmaking, in turn, diminishes civic responsibility, especially since
precautionary analyses address only post risk-confirmation concerns,
erasing the possibility of deeper inquiries into how risks are
created. 120
III. PRECAUTIONARY DECISIONS AND THE CHARACTER OF SCIENTIFIC
KNOWLEDGE

Three instances of precautionary (environmental) governance are
studied below. In the first, a political decision is understood as
precautionary specifically because it runs counter to prevailing
scientific knowledge. In the second instance, precaution is conveyed
as a holistic ethic in response to widespread environmental
degradation. However, this interpretation is quickly eroded as
precautionary choices are limited to industry best practices and best
available standards of scientific evidence that obfuscate links
between environmental crisis and modernization. Finally, in the late
20th century, international dispute resolution bodies make
precautionary practices contingent on scientific evidence, overruling
decisions of political sovereigns.
A. In the Shadow ofKing Cholera
Cholera was once more at large. It spread, Dr. John Snow opined
in his pamphlet of 1849,121 through the consumption of sewagecontaminated water. Based on his theory, Snow studied the
commonalities between eighty-three deaths in the Golden Square
area of London, and proposed that the water-pump on Broad Street
120. See BECK, supra note 23, at 24-33.
121. See JOHN SNOW, ON THE MODE OF COMMUNICATION OF CHOLERA (1849),

available at http://www.ph.ucla.edu/epi/snow/snowbook.html (last updated May 3,
2014); see also John Snow Facts, JOHN SNOW Soc., http://www.johnsnowsociety.

org/johnsnow/facts.html (last updated May 23, 2008).
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be quarantined because there was "no particular outbreak or
prevalence of cholera in this part of London except among the
persons who were in the habit of drinking the water of the abovementioned [Broad Street] pump-well."l22 However, the Royal
College of Physicians had previously rejected Snow's thesis,
believing the contaminant to be airborne,123 and did not change its
position.124 Still, out of desperation, Snow's recommendation was
acceded to and the water-pump's handle removed. The move,
publicly depicted as no more than precautionary, proved successful in
curbing the spread of infection in the area.125
The continued rejection of Snow's thesis and the depiction of the
government's action as precautionary were not happenstance. They
were, rather, the opening gambits of a specific strategy of governance
that Urlich Beck outlines when he tells us that in the "risk-society,"
the conflict over control of means of production is replaced by
conflict over the means of production of knowledge.126 Specifically,
the government in Snow's London understood that taking
precautionary action did not mean accepting the knowledge from
which the justification for the recommended action emerged. To the
contrary, the governmental machinery worked harder to emphasize
the precautionary nature of the move by continually marginalizing
Snow as a scientific expert. Given that only a year before the Cholera
outbreak in question, the Committee on Scientific Inquiries of the
General Board of Health had attested that it had "no reason to
122. John Snow, Letter to the Editor, The Cholera Near Golden-Square, and at
Deptford, MED. TIMES & GAZETTE, Sept. 23, 1854, at 321, 321, available at http://

www.ph.ucla.edu/epi/snow/choleragoldensquare.html.
123. EUROPEAN ENV'T AGENCY, ENVTL. ISSUE REPORT No. 22/2001, LATE
LESSONS FROM EARLY WARNINGS: THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 1896-2000, at
14-15 (Poul Harremo~s et al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter LATE LESSONS].
124. See Ralph R. Frerichs, Removal of the Pump Handle, UCLA DEP'T OF
EPIDEMIOLOGY, http://www.ph.ucla.edu/epi/snow/removal.html (last visited Apr.

13, 2014) ('The Board of Guardians [of the St. James Parish] met to consult as to
what ought to be done. Of that meeting, the late Dr. Snow demanded an
audience. . . . He was not believed-not a member of his own profession, not an
individual in the parish believed that Snow was right. But the pump was closed
nevertheless and the plague was stayed."').
125. See Snow, supra note 122; LATE LESSONS, supra note 123, at 14; see also
PERROW, supra note 56, at 29 (illustrating similar actions preceding the Three Mile
Island nuclear plant meltdown in 1979).
126. See BECK, supra note 23, at 52-54.
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adopt ... [Snow's] belief," coupled with the fact that it would be
another thirty-years before the pathophysiology of Cholera would be
proven to the satisfaction of prevailing scientific standards, it bears
emphasizing that Snow's 1949 pamphlet was rejected by scientific
publications at large, leading him to self-publish at great personal
expense with next -to no pecuniary returns. 127
1. Corralling Knowledge in Victorian England
That Snow has been described as one who "always spoke to the
point but found it difficult to obtain a favourable notice,"1 2 8 seems to
mirror his stature as a scientific expert.129 Despite the diminished rate
of local infections following the removal of the water-pump-handle,
the Committee on Scientific Inquiries rejected Snow's thesis, and
continued to insist that the Golden Square outbreak was the result of
some miasma (toxic atmospheric influences). 130 But this was not
simply an egotistical maneuver; it was also an act in advancement of
the centralization of scientific knowledge. Through their public
disposition, governmental authorities aligned themselves firmly in
the noxious miasma theory's camp alongside the likes of another
contemporary Cholera expert, Edmund Parkes,131 amongst others1 32
who, intentionally or otherwise, misunderstood Snow's methodology.
127. Snow spent £200 to publish the pamphlet. It earned about £3.12. Facts,
supra note 121. One reviewer of his theory wrote, "'There is, in our view, an entire
failure of proof that the occurrence of any one case could be clearly and
unambiguously assigned to water."' Id. He concluded, "Notwithstanding our
opinion that Dr [sic] Snow has failed in proving that cholera is communicated in
the mode in which he supposes it to be, he deserves the thanks of the profession for
endeavouring to solve the mystery. It is only by close analysis of facts and the
publication of new views, that we can hope to arrive at the truth." Id.
128. Facts,supra note 121.

129. Reverend Henry Whitehead's defense of Snow begins as follows: "'Dr.
Snow's views on Cholera,' said a medical friend to me in 1855, 'are generally
regarded in the profession as very unsound."' SANDRA HEMPEL, THE STRANGE
CASE OF THE BROAD STREET PUMP: JOHN SNOW AND THE MYSTERY OF CHOLERA

223 (2007).
130. Nigel Paneth et al., A Rivalry of Foulness: Official and Unofficial
Investigations of the London Cholera Epidemic of 1854, 88 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
1545 (1998).

131. Parkes' critique asked, "[W]hy should not the cholera have prevailed
equally everywhere where the water was drunk? ... There are, indeed, so many
pumps in this district, that wherever the outbreak had taken place, it would most
probably have had one pump or another in its vicinity." Howard Brody et al., Map-
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Another instance of such a maneuver is found in how post-mortem
spot-maps were utilized to confirm the legitimacy of the
Government's position (while showing Snow's method to be
simplistic). Snow's first report on the 1854 outbreak of Cholera was
delivered on behalf of St. James Parish, which had seen over 500
people die within ten days.133 While part of Snow's conceptualization
(of deaths in relation to local water access points) was topographic,
his report to the committee made no reference to map reading.
Instead, his insightful recommendation was actually based on an
extensive survey of the deaths in the area including "remarkable and
striking cases," the consumption habits of the locality, as well as a
study of the different sources of water servicing the area.134
When the Committee at St. James's Parish published the
government map (included as part of Cooper's Report)135 alongside
Snow's findings, its members hoped the two reports would bolster
Snow's conclusions (which the Parish supported, with the exception
of his oral-fecal transmission theory).136 The government, however,
interpreted this publication as evidence that Snow's conclusions were
based solely on a simplistic, rational-reading of the spot-maps
identifying localized deaths.137 In Snow's London, the introduction of
an expansive, centralized sewer system capable of creating and
multiplying public-health risks bound together the interests of the
Making and Myth-Making in Broad Street: The London Cholera Epidemic, 1854,
356 LANCET 64, 67 (2000), available at http://www.uio.no/studier/emner/matnat/

ifi/INF5761/v12/undervisningsmateriale/mapmakingmythmaking.pdf.
132. See, e.g., id. at n.3.
133. See CHOLERA INQUIRY COMMITTEE, REPORT ON THE CHOLERA OUTBREAK
IN THE PARISH OF ST. JAMES, WESTMINSTER, DURING THE AUTUMN OF 1854 (1855),
reprinted in WILLIAM T. SEDGWICK, PRINCIPLES OF SANITARY SCIENCE AND THE
PUBLIC HEALTH 172 (1925).

134. Id. at 174-78.
135. See Brody et al., supra note 131, at n.12.
136. Id. at 66 (discussing the later "government" map).
137. See id. at 64 (arguing that such "apocryphal" theories assume "that any
reasonable person, looking at such a spot map, would have drawn the same
conclusion ... other observers looked at even more detailed and accurate maps
than Snow's, yet came to different conclusions about the cause of the cholera
outbreak. Moreover, Snow developed and tested his hypothesis will [sic] before he
drew his map. The map did not give rise to the insight, but rather it tended to
confirm theories already held. . . ."). It must also be noted that since Cooper's
Report did not observe any specific locus of deaths near the water-pump, it is
unlikely that a simple reading of the map could have led Snow to his suspicions.
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Board of Health and the Sewer Commission (in seeing gully holes
and sewer excavations cleared of suspicion). In keeping with
cartography's reputation for being susceptible to political goals, 138
Cooper's Report (including the Government map) cleared the sewers
of blame while drawing attention to the deaths around Broad
Street. 139 Accordingly, the government's actions remained purely
precautionary.
Ultimately, the farcical nature of the governmental machinations is
captured by the turncoat visible in the research and reportage of John
Simon, whose report on behalf of the Committee for Scientific
Inquiry of the Board of Health had been influential in rejecting
Snow's theory:1 40 within a year following the rejection of Snow's
theory, Simon published a study that was a "virtual replica" of
Snow's water-supply-contamination thesis but made no reference to
the doctor or his antecedent works.141 By way of explaining the delay
in supplying these results, Simon blamed a clerical failure to "collate
the results in time" for his earlier 1854 study criticizing Snow.142
But if the government essentially agreed with Snow's conclusions,
why enact such an elaborate exercise in stifling his work? Perhaps
because acknowledging Snow's conclusions would provide for his
original theory regarding the mode of transmission of Cholera-that
it spread through fecal matter in the water supply being orally
consumed by humans. 143 In appreciating the politics of eating-shit,as
it were, there is also an element of collective avoidance that Beck
describes when he explains that, "[r]isks can be legitimated by the

138. See SCOTT, supra note 9 at 87-88.

139. See Brody et al., supra note 131, at 66 ("[T]he sewers were not the cause of
the cholera; that they were not in any way connected with the disease; but that the
real cause of the calamitous occurrences in the locality . .. was the filthy and
undrained state of the houses."). Of significant importance in this move, was the
need to "allay public fears." Id.; see also SCOTT, supra note 9, at 87 (explaining
that the transformative power, "resides not in the map, of course, but rather in the
power possessed by those who deploy the perspective of that particular map.").
140. JOHN SIMON, REPORT ON THE CHOLERA EPIDEMIC OF 1854, AS IT PREVAILED
IN THE CITY OF LONDON 11 (1854), available at http://pds.lib.harvard.edu/pds/
view/7245326?n=17&printThumbnails no.
141. HEMPEL, supra note 129, at 244. John Snow did not complain.
142. Id.
143. See generally CHARLES E. ROSENBERG, THE CHOLERA YEARS: THE UNITED
STATES IN 1832, 1849, AND 1866 (1987).
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fact that one neither saw nor wanted their consequences."l44 Giving
credence to Snow's method would elevate his underlying theory to
one deserving the state's endorsement, to say nothing of the British
Royal family. Instead, by centralizing scientific knowledge, ordering
the role of discourse in shaping authority and public perceptions, and
ultimately managing the life of its citizens, worked as a circling of
the wagons.
Studying Snow's case allows for a number of inferences: First,
Snow's case weakens the assumption that precautionary decisions are
natural, rational or obvious: the decision in Snow's London, was
structured by an ambivalent mixture of concerns addressing a large
scale public health dilemma, upholding prevailing morals, meeting
the needs of political authority, while also consolidating the power of
technical expertise. Second, the case shows that since marginalized
knowledges are, by definition, not acceptable as adequate evidence of
risk, it is doubtful that liberal public discussions of risk built around
standardized scientific knowledge can reach beyond injunctive
actions to inquire into how modem risks are created and distributed.
Finally, the case highlights that the decision to remove the pump
handle was precautionary because it erred on the side of safety,
against the established scientific wisdom of the times, while still
hastening the need for refined knowledge.145
B. PrivilegingScientific Knowledge

In the sections to follow I will show how, in post-war Germany
and before international dispute resolution tribunals, precaution was
depoliticized in favor of calls for more and better scientific evidence.
1. Vorsorge and the Globalization of Best-Available Knowledge
In post-WWII Germany, the ethic of Vorsorge conveyed a
commitment to care for the future. 146 But citizens remained heavily
144. BECK, supra note 23, at 34.
145. See LATE LESSONS, supra note 123, at 14 (describing the Snow interface as

a "classic case of precautionary prevention," because of its foregrounding of "key
elements of .. . scientific uncertainty, ignorance and policy-making.").
146. See Boehmer-Christiansen, supra note 7, at 55-56, writing:
While vague, the idea of precaution has played a powerful role in
the German environmental policy process ... The concept of
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influenced by recent memories of urban rubble and ruined
infrastructure. Blackbourn summarizes the schizophrenic ethos,
writing:
Memories of being exposed to the elements drove postwar
reconstruction and help to explain the importance attached
to satisfying material needs, at whatever cost to the natural
world. But the abjectness of defeat and destruction also
pulled people . . . to seek solace, and one of the places
where they found it was in nature . . . . After German cities
had been reduced to rubble . .. identification with the
landscape and "healing earth" . . . allowed Germans to see

themselves as victims. 147
Unsurprisingly, policies based on Vorsorge were justified based on
the widely touted belief that environmental protection and economic
development (then considered modernization) were actually naturally
compatible. 148 Accordingly, in Germany and, later on, across the
Vorsorge as a duty of "good" government predicated on the
belief that economic development and environmental protection
are mutually supportive, helps to explain why the German State
may adopt a proactive stance in environmental matters in order to
establish its constitutional authority. Vorsorge therefore provides
a philosophical principle and tool of persuasion to justify the
setting of ambitious environmental targets. There is no legal or
institutional requirement to "prove" damage scientifically or to
cost it accurately, before action is legitimate. The promulgation
of these targets may therefore become the responsibility of every
citizen, industrialist and administrator ...Vorsorge gives little
guidance as to what instruments are to be adopted, for its aim it
primarily to overcome the political and legal opposition of vested
interest to public policies. The precautionary principle therefore
helped to lay the conceptual and legal basis for a proactive
environmental policy which, once spread into Europe, was also
directed at ensuring 'burden sharing' in order that German
industry would not lose its competitive edge, but rather gain new
markets for its environment-friendly technology and products.
147. DAVID BLACKBOURN, THE CONQUEST OF NATURE: WATER, LANDSCAPE,
AND THE MAKING OF MODERN GERMANY 323 (2007).

148. See O'Riordan & Jordan, supra note 10, at 193. Two implications are
emphasized in this essay: that assessments based on Sustainable Development
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Europe Community, Vorsorge was understood as synonymous with
the creation of cleaner technologies; 149 a little like the contemporary
obsession with the label "green." As Sonja Boehmer-Christiansen
describes, Germany's understanding of Vorsorge globalized because
it "suited the political and economic ambitions of the [European]
Commission."15 0 During this expansion, the popular understanding of
precaution was standardized as "best available technology."
Germany, in turn, used Vorsorge in tandem with the principle of
common-burden sharing to subsidize and develop its domestic
industries without running afoul of the larger economic framework of
the developing European Community.1 5 1 To the contrary, Vorsorge
stimulated the development of a distinct, novel and profitable ecoindustrial sector. Unsurprisingly, over the years, this ethic has come
to be identified as "ecological modernization."1 52
As precaution came to be seen as synonymous with the
development and application of clean technologies, the emphasis
across Europe, shifted to developing a generalized body of
standardized rules and conditions that would facilitate and encourage
the rapid dissemination of such technologies.153 In being woven
around the politics of "best available technology" and related legal
standardized rules, the Vorsorge acted as a hinge around which a
diversity of political, economic, and technical institutions and experts
negotiated for power.154
With increased dependence on seemingly politically-neutral
technologies and technical rules/standards, the Vorsorge was upheld
stripped of all eco-centric (Natur/Umwelt) imperatives and treated as
openly appropriable for all manner of marketing campaigns. The
consequent loss of eco-centric decisionism is highlighted by
Boehmer-Christiansen's observation that later attempts to anoint the
reflect some natural coherence, and that existing environmental degradation cannot
be blamed on government policies. See Boehmer-Christiansen, supra note 7, at 40-

49.
149. See Boehmer-Christiansen, supra note 7, at 50.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 34.
152. See id. at 32 (describing how, in the 1970s and 1980s, Vorsorge was put to
work in favor of a "much broader effort to initiate and justify a period of 'industrial
restructuring and modernisation [sic]."').
153. Id. at 52.
154. Id. at 51.
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Vorsorgeprinzip as a Staatsziel (a legally binding objective of the

German Federation as opposed to its earlier status as a constitutional
aspiration in a number of German states) was defeated by "the major
conservative parties," and "political forces in charge of the German
state in the early 1990s seemed afraid to accept the responsibilities
they had so eagerly sought during the 1980s.' 15 5 Even the accounting
restraints of cost-benefit analysis, it appears, didn't hamper the
enthusiasm cultured by the Vorsorge, because while civic
negotiations included reckoning with economic-feasibility issues,
discussions of what the Vorsorge actually required of the state
(mobilized under the rubric of the aforementioned naturalized
coherence between economic development/environmental protection)
merely called for all concerned stakeholders to act. 156 Precautionary
thinking was not the basis for decisionist governance, but rather an
instrument mobilized for endless review, debate, and negotiation. As
such, no matter how grand or perpendicular the political promises, as
long as they were promoted as based on the Vorsorge, they could not
be countered as irrational or false. Unsurprisingly, the resulting
law, the Vorsorgeprinzip, proved equally unreliable when it came to
representing any one "side," be it in a specific dispute or a larger
dialectical opposition. 15 Accordingly, when German governments'
of the late 1980s and early 1990s sought to raise the price of energy,
the resulting carbon/energy tax was justified using the Vorsorge; but
the major opposition to such a tax, curiously enough, also drew its
authority from the Vorsorge, going so far as being christened, the
"Initiative for German Business for World-Wide Precautionary
Action to Protect Climate Change."1 59 Overall, civic-negotiations
155. Id. at 32-33.

156. Id. at 38.
157. With respect to a similar move involving the rise of precaution within the
European Union, see Dratwa, supra note 107, at 282, which lists a number of
advantages offered by the precautionary principle: "as a representative of the
citizens' demands, as a symbol of European difference, as a linchpin of biopolitics
and, by appealing to public values, as placing legitimacy beyond mere legality.").
158. O'Riordan & Jordan, supra note 10, at 209 (proclaiming "humanism and
capitalism, between fairness and efficiency, emotional value and utilitarianism.").
159. With respect to such "resistance" (by delaying or direct opposition) tactics
employed by the Bund Deutscher Industrie "BDI" (Federation of German Industry)
against the German air-pollution law. See, e.g., CAROL J. HAGER, TECHNOLOGICAL
DEMOCRACY: BUREAUCRACY AND CITIZENRY IN THE GERMAN ENERGY DEBATE

62-63 (1995).
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between various interest groups, accounting for the polluter-pays
principle, the principle of economic feasibility, the Common burden
principle, led to a form of governance that was not deliberately
precautionary, but consisted of agreements that often contradicted
each other, ultimately reflecting "the balance of political powers and
motivations at work in individual cases,"1 60 a situation that sounds
suspiciously like the power-dynamics of Sustainable Development.
The mere engagement in civic-negotiations does not, of course,
imply a victory of political democracy over techno-scientific
expertise. In post-war Germany, Vorsorge was not interpreted as an
actual challenge to the modernizing, techno-scientific status quo, but
rather as ushering in an era of globalizing, techno-science coded,
legal rules and standards.
a. The MainstreamingofBest-Available Knowledge

The resulting attitude is attested to by Ireland in the 2003 MOX
Plant Case arbitration proceedings: 16 1 "This case is not a dispute
about science. It is in essence a dispute over the failure of the United
Kingdom to fulfill three categories of legal obligation under
UNCLOS [United Nations Convention on the Land of the Sea]."l 6 2
On the one hand, Ireland's elaboration of the specific obligations
conveys the understanding of precaution globalizing out of Germany
(i.e., Vorsorge as: politicized ethic 4

"natural" ethic 4

techno-

scientific policy 4 technical legal obligation):
The obligation placed directly upon the United Kingdom
itself to take all the steps necessary to protect and preserve
the marine environment of the Irish Sea. Ireland considers
that the United Kingdom has violated various provisions of
160. Boehmer-Christiansen, supra note 7, at 35.
161. See The MOX Plant Case (Ir. v. U.K.) (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2003), http://
www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pagid=1148
[hereinafter MOX Plant]. The
dispute arose around the Irish charge that a British nuclear fuel processing facility
at Sellafield was discharging radioactive wastes into the surrounding Irish Sea and,
thereby, the government of the United Kingdom was in violation of the United
Nations Convention on the Land of the Sea (UNCLOS) and other international
treaties. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for
signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994).
162. See Memorial of Ireland, Vol. I 1.3, MOX Plant, http://www.pca-cpa.org/
upload/files/Ireland%/o20Memorial%/o2OPart%/o201.pdf.

592

FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XXV

UNCLOS ...
as well as obligations to apply a
precautionary approach and make use of "best available
technologies" and "best environmental practices."1 63
On the other hand, the arbitral tribunal's decision on Ireland's
Request for Provisions Measures, is an instructive primer on how

such standardizations are understood over the course of actual
controversies: in that case, the tribunal did not directly address the
precautionary character of Ireland's claim, nor did it consider that the
OSPAR convention being interpreted, arguably lex specialis between
the disputing parties,-164 explicitly requires contracting parties to
"apply the precautionary principle."1 65 Instead, the majority opinion
outright rejected Ireland's assertion that the United Kingdom should
bear the burden of proof (for showing, prima facie, that there would
be no adverse affect on the marine life in the Irish Sea), 166 as is
generally deemed consistent with precautionary claims.167 Instead,
the tribunal interpreted the UNCLOS narrowly, explaining: "Under
article 290, paragraph 1, any harm caused, or likely to be caused, to
16 3. Id.
164. See Final Award
84, 100, Dispute Concerning Access to Information
under Article 9 of the OSPAR Convention (OSPAR Dispute) (Ir. v. U.K.) (Perm.
Ct. Arb. 2003) (July 2, 2003), http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/OSPAR%/
20Award.pdf.
165. Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East
Atlantic art. 2(2)(a), opened for signature Sept. 22, 1992, 2354 U.N.T.S. 67
[hereinafter OSPAR Convention], stating:
The Contracting Parties shall apply: (a) the precautionary
principle, by virtue of which preventive measures are to be taken
when there are reasonable grounds for concern that substances or
energy introduced, directly or indirectly, into the marine
environment may bring about hazards to human health, harm
living resources and marine ecosystems, damage amenities or
interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea, even when there is
no conclusive evidence of a causal relationship between the
inputs and the effects.
166. See Order No. 3, 41, MOXPlant (June 24, 2003), http://www.pca-cpa.org/
showfile.asp?fil id=81; OSPAR Dispute, 179; see also OSPAR Dispute, 72,
(Griffith, Q.C., dissenting), http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/OSPAR%/ 20
Award.pdf.
167. See Communication, supra note 5,

§ 6.4.
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the marine environment must be 'serious' before the Tribunal's
power to prescribe provisional measures on that basis arises."1 68 The
majority then bolstered its reasoning by drawing on "international
judicial practice" to confirm:
[T]hat a general requirement for the prescription of
provisional measures to protect the rights of the Parties is
that there needs to be a showing both of urgency and of
irreparable harm to the claimed rights (see, e.g.[,] the Order
of 17 June 2003 of the International Court of Justice in the
Case concerning Certain Criminal Proceedings in France
(Republic of the Congo v. France), paragraphs 34-35).169

In this instance, the tribunal not only ignored precautionary language
in the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of
the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR Convention) and the corresponding
shift in the burden of proof, but also avoided a wealth of statepractice supporting Ireland's claim.170 Instead, the tribunal relied on
the United Kingdom's assertion that the MOX Plant facility had no
ongoing contracts, to reason that no immediate or future threat
existed.
This course of reasoning was particularly surprising
because the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS)
had yet to decide on a parallel, extensively argued suit regarding the
MOX plant's potential for adverse (future) environmental affects. 172
Nevertheless the arbitral tribunal followed the ITLOS173 by
primarily focusing on procedural issues, i.e., the need for continued
and "improved cooperation between the Parties and the provision of
information."1 74 At length, the tribunal insisted on a joint review of
the entire intergovernmental system of notification and cooperation
in effect at the time, holding fast to the popular liberal notion that
fundamental differences in values and concerns may actually be little
168. Order No. 3, 55, MOXPlant (emphasis added).
169. Id. 58 (emphasis in original).
170. See OSPAR Dispute, 20-33 (Griffith, Q.C., dissenting).
171. Order No. 3, f 61-62, MOXPlant.
172. See OSPAR Dispute,
84-89 (Griffith, Q.C., dissenting).
173. The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) has previously
rejected Ireland's initial request that the MOX Plant not be commissioned.
174. Order No. 3, 59, MOXPlant.
175. Id. 66.
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more than differences in information. Yet, despite this emphasis on
cooperation and consultation, the Tribunal's interpretation of the
nature of relevant knowledge (i.e., what kinds of information Ireland
could demand of the United Kingdom under Article 9(2) of the
OSPAR Convention1 76 ) severely restricted both Ireland's ability to
make its case,
and the Tribunal's own ability to determine the
extent or possibility of environmental harm.17 8 Ignoring the fact that
Ireland's arguments were directed against specific claims made by
the United Kingdom (and not as general proof of environmental
harm), the tribunal rules against Ireland1 79 as having failed to meet its
burden of proof,180 ignoring, as previously mentioned, the altered
burden of proof in precautionary claims.
For our purposes, the relevant insight is not that Ireland was
correct or the United Kingdom wrong. What is important is that
regardless of how the dispute was ultimately resolved, the disputing
parties and the tribunal all shared an attitude that can be traced back
to the post-war globalization of Vorsorge: we might recall the initial
Irish claim (that the dispute was not about science but about whether
the UK had violated technical legal obligations) and compare the
same to the United Kingdom's subsequent technical rebuttal (on the
issue of access to information), "The relevant question, however, is
not whether MOX production will affect the maritime area. It is
whether the information requested is information on activities or

176. OSPAR Convention, supra note 165, art. 9(2) ("The information referred to
in paragraph 1 of this Article is any available information in written, visual, aural
or data-base form on the state of the maritime area, on activities or measures
adversely affecting or likely to affect it and on activities or measures introduced in
accordance with the Convention.").
177. For a detailed critique, see OSPAR Dispute,
35-71 (Griffith, Q.C.,
dissenting).
178. Id.
40-48 (arguing that, in determining whether certain information
redacted by the United Kingdom (on the ground that they relate to commerce)
should indeed be shared with Ireland, the Tribunal is being asked to interpret the
"extent and inclusiveness" of the definition of Article 9(2) of the OSPAR
Convention. The Tribunal, however, explicitly refuses to engage this larger issue,
viewing each piece of information in the shared reports as independent of others,
and thus capable of being judged in isolation to ensure it is included under the
meaning of Article 9(2)).
179. See id.

180. Id.

75.

77-78.
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measures adversely affecting or likely to affect the maritime area."181
Similarly, the majority wrote:
It is true that the 1992 Convention for the Protection of the
Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic ("the
OSPAR Convention") is relevant to some at least of the
questions in issue between the Parties, but the Tribunal
does not consider that this alters the character of the dispute
as one essentially involving the interpretation and
application of the Convention.1 82
Once the precautionary basis for the claim is ignored, then, within
and with respect to the terms of the dispute, the disputants and the
tribunal all agree about what is at stake and the scope of acceptable
arguments.183 Consequently, what began as a precautionary claim
concerned with actualpollution of the marine environment becomes
a dispute that can be disposed of by a meditation on the appropriate

181. Counter Memorial of the United Kingdom, 4.3, MOX Plant (Ir. v. U.K.)
(Perm. Ct. Arb. 2003), http://www.pca-cpa.org/showfile.asp?filid=227 (emphasis
in original).
182. Order No. 3, 18, Mox Plant.
183. Redacting mention of the Precautionary Principle from Article 2 of the
OSPAR Convention, we would be left with Article 2(3) which reads:
(a) In implementing the Convention, Contracting Parties shall
adopt programmes and measures which contain, where
appropriate, time limits for their completion and which take full
account of the use of the latest technological developments and
practices designed to prevent and eliminate pollution fully.
(b) To this end they shall:
(i) taking into account the criteria set forth in Appendix 1, define
with respect to programmes and measures the application of,
inter alia,
- best available techniques
- best environmental practice

including, where appropriate, clean technology;
(ii) in carrying out such programmes and measures, ensure the
application of best available techniques and best environmental
practice as so defined, including, where appropriate, clean
technology.
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standard of cooperation, legal consultation, and the technicalities of
information sharing.
But, this conclusion notwithstanding, the MOX Plant proceedings
also show that the globalization of best-available legal standards,
technologies, and knowledge, still remains unstable. For instance,
Ireland's initial claim charged that the United Kingdom had "violated
various provisions of UNCLOS, including . .. Articles 192, 193, 194,
207, 211, 212, 213, 217 and 222, as well as obligations to apply a
precautionary approach and make use of 'best available technologies'
and 'best environmental practices,"'l 84 indicating that for the Irish
there was more to the ethic of precaution than the routine application
of codified rules and best-practices. It would appear, then, that the
rhetoric of international legal discourse does not completely negate
the ethical mandate underlying the precautionary relationship.
2. International Dispute Resolution and the Continuing
Globalization of More, Better Science
Decisions of 20th century international dispute resolution tribunals
show the continuing legalistic standardization of right-knowledge
and expertise through strategies that may be stereotyped as silence
and avowal.
a. Silence Observed at the InternationalCourt ofJustice
The Gabdikovo-Nagymaros Project,8 5 heard by the International
Court of Justice (ICJ), involved a 1977 treaty between Hungary and
Slovakia for the construction and joint management of two sets of
locks and the corresponding hydroelectric-power stations on the
Danube River (one each at Gabdikovo then in Czechoslovakia, and
Nagymaros in Hungary). In 1989, over a decade into construction,
Hungary suspended operations and then, in 1992, proceeded to
terminate the treaty on the grounds that the project threatened the
local environment. Czechoslovakia retaliated by diverting the section
of the river within its territory leading to reduced water through
Hungary.

184. Memorial of Ireland, Vol. I, 1.3(3), MOXPlant.
185. Gabbikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25).
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A straightforward reading of the decision gives the impression that
the ICJ resolutely avoided reviewing scientific evidence altogether,1 86
a position for which it has been heavily criticized.1 87 But this
impression, though factually accurate, is of limited value in analyzing
how the decision reflects on environmental law more generally. Two
implications of the Court's maneuver are worth noting: first, through
its avoidance, the ICJ used the parties' foregrounding of Sustainable
Development to flip the responsibility back onto them.188 This move
parallels one understanding of precaution that generalizes the
responsibility for decision-making by calling for a negotiatedconsensus amongst interest groups as to how real threats actually
are. 189 But, reading the ICJ's reasoning in the wider context of
dispute, we find this avoidance of scientific evidence to be delicately
coded with meaning and significance. For instance, in responding to
Hungary's claim, that it had terminated its treaty with Slovakia as
part of a precautionary plan of action, the court decided that
Hungary's scientific evidence had failed to sufficiently establish a
serious threat of ecological peril.190 While acknowledging the natural
186. Upon giving "most careful attention" to the scientific evidence in the case,
the ICJ concluded that it was "not necessary ... for [the Court] to determine which
of those [the parties'] points of view is scientifically better founded." Id. 54.
187. See, e.g., Dobos, supra note 91, at 394-99 (discussing how, despite visiting
the site of the dam, the Court's decision lacks transparency as to the judges'
reasoning). Dobos points out that the Court declined to utilize the services of its
specialized chamber for Environmental Matters. It is curious, however, that despite
the accurate observation that "the I.C.J. was worried that the mere recognition of
scientific uncertainty would have undermined the sanctity of legal certainty,"
Dobos proceeds to argue that outsourcing scientific analysis or the use of the
abovementioned Environmental Chamber, would allow the Precautionary Principle
to add "certainty to the defense of ecological necessity." Id. at 397-98; see also
Erika L. Preiss, Note, The InternationalObligation to Conduct an Environmental
Impact Assessment: The ICJ Case Concerning the Gabdikovo-Nagymaros Project,
7 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 307, 344 (1999).
188. See Gabdikovo-Nagymaros, 1997 I.C.J.
140 ("This need to reconcile
economic development with protection of the environment is aptly expressed in the
concept of sustainable development. For the purposes of the present case, this
means that the Parties together should look afresh at the effects on the environment
of the operation of the Gabbikovo power plant. In particular they must find a
satisfactory solution .... ).
189. See infra PartI (discussing the works of Hey, and O'Riordan and Jordan).
190. See Gabdikovo-Nagymaros, 1997 I.C.J. 54 stating:
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environment as being an "essential interest," 91 the judges adopted a
high activation-threshold for precautionary measures, requiring that
the threat being responded to, be a 'grave' and 'imminent'
'peril."'92 At this point in the decision, the ICJ made a clear but
unarticulated choice-i.e. the stringency with which it decided what
constituted credible scientific evidence (in that case, evidence going
beyond "mere apprehension of a possible peril. .. .. 193). Through
this move, the ICJ no longer sought to equip decision-makers to
make a political decision under conditions of uncertainty (as
represented in the final order). Rather, the judges actually made a
decision in favor of one party in the absence of more and better
scientific evidence. The ICJ's refusal to review scientific evidence
about sustainability claims, and its turn to science when reviewing
precautionary measures, coalesce to deepen globalizing standards of
veracity, rather than facilitating cooperative environmental decisions
under conditions of scientific uncertainty in a particular country.
Unsurprisingly, the ICJ's avoidance, its silence, turns out to be
powerful speech. Viewed as the first major opportunity for an
international tribunal to comment on Sustainable Development,1 94 the
The Court considers, however, that, serious though these
uncertainties might have been they could not, alone, establish the
objective existence of a "peril" in the sense of a component
element of a state of necessity. The word "peril" certainly evokes
the idea of "risk"; that is precisely what distinguishes "peril"
from material damage. But a state of necessity could not exist
without a 'peril' duly established at the relevant point in time; the
mere apprehension of a possible "peril" could not suffice in that
respect. It could moreover hardly be otherwise, when the "peril"
constituting the state of necessity has at the same time to be
"grave" and "imminent". [stet] "Imminence" is synonymous with
"immediacy" or "proximity" and goes far beyond the concept of
"possibility". [stet]
191. Id. 53 (internal quotations omitted).
192. Id. 54 ("The Hungarian argument on the state of necessity could not
convince the Court unless it was at least proven that a real, 'grave' and 'imminent'
'peril' existed in 1989 and that the measures taken by Hungary were the only
possible response to it.").
193. Id.

54.

194. I will mention only a few notable comments here, such as, Paulo Canelas de
Castro, The Judgment in the Case Concerning the Gabbikovo-Nagymaros Project:
Positive Signs for the Evolution of International Water Law, 8 Y.B. INT'L ENVTL.
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Gabdikovo-Nagymaros decision
has
been
criticized
as
underwhelming, and the ICJ judged as less than competent to assess
transboundary environmental disputes.1 95 In the wake of the
judgment, most international tribunals relied on the ICJ's reluctance,
to themselves refuse customary status to both Sustainable
Development and the Precautionary Principle.1 96 Nevertheless, these
institutions accepted the procedural concept of sustainability1 97 where
environmental protection interests and economic growth are no
longer opposed or even distinct. 198 Consequently, legal experts who
have passionately disagreed about whether or not Sustainable
Development or the Precautionary Principle are part of customary
international law,1 99 presume the stakes to be higher than they
actually are.
Before the World Trade Organization (WTO), however, the
mediation between contrasting understandings of precaution (either
as a contextualizing of scientific evidence in the face of uncertainty,
or as a call for more and better standardized science) plays out
differently, but with eerily similar results.

L. 21 (1997);

Daniel Reichert-Facilides, Down the Danube: The Vienna

Convention on the Law of Treaties and the Case Concerning the Gabbikovo-

Nagymaros Project, 47 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 837 (1998).
195. See Dobos, supra note 91, at 396-98.
196. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, European Communities-EC Measures
Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), 123, n.93, WT/DS26/AB/R,

WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) [hereinafter Beef Hormones] (referencing the
International Court of Justice's decision in Gabdikovo-Nagymaros).
197. See Jessica Howley, The Gabbikovo-Nagymaros Case: The Influence of the
International Court of Justice on the Law of Sustainable Development, 2
QUEENSLAND L. STUDENT REV. 1, 8-11 (2009) (describing the results of a survey

of commentary and case law that shows the widespread acceptance of the
"concept" of Sustainable Development). In terms of the globalization of the logic
sustainability, therefore, we find that the ICJ's majority decision (which barely
outlines the logic of Sustainable Development), read together with Judge
Weeramantry's Separate Opinion (that heavily endorses the "concept"), have been
understood as an active endorsement of Sustainable Development sans particulars.
198. See Gabdikovo-Nagymaros, 1997 I.C.J.

1 140.

199. For a summary of this debate, see generally McIntyre & Mosedale, supra
note 8.
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b. Avowal: Open Mic at the World Trade Organization

Case law repeatedly presents two interpretations of precaution: one
that is explicit, involving high rhetoric where with respect to
decisions, scientific certainty is not an expectation;200 the other
implicit, found in the actual interpretation of precaution by decisionmakers (whereby the legality of decisions hinges on scientific
verifiability).201 The tension between these two portrayals, deftly
navigated by the ICJ in the dispute over the Gabdikovo-Nagymaros
dam, comes to the fore again, when the World Trade Organization
Dispute Settlement Body (WTO-DSB) demands greater scientific
certainty202 before a state party may breach trade obligations by
precautionarily quarantining imports. But far from the muted
juggling of the ICJ, the WTO-DSB actively affirms the positive
telling of international law as trellised around a rhetoric of progress;
a rhetoric that I have suggested stands in direct opposition to a moral,
political, and counter-modern understanding of the precautionary
relationship of precaution. Nevertheless, to appreciate how this
conflict develops, we might begin by noting how the call for "more
science" is legitimated within the WTO's adjudication process.
Article 5.7 of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures203 allows state parties to impose provisional,
risk-regulation measures provided they "seek to obtain the additional
information necessary for a more objective assessment of
risk ... .,,204 The WTO-DSB, in its Beef Hormones decision,
interpreted this provision as reflecting the Precautionary Principle, 205

200. See Memorial of Ireland, Vol. I, 3.52, MOX Plant Case (Ir. v. U.K.)
(Perm. Ct. Arb. 2003), http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/Ireland%/o20Memorial%/
20Part%201.pdf.
201. See discussion of the ICJ and WTO-DSB decisions in this Part.
202. See BeefHormones, supra note 196,

123.

203. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493 [hereinafter SPS].
204. Id. art. 5.7.
205. Beef Hormones, supra note 196,
124 ("[T]he precautionary principle
indeed finds reflection in Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement . .. that there is no need
to assume that Article 5.7 exhausts the relevance of a precautionary principle.")
(emphasis removed); see also SPS, supra note 203, art. 3.3.
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which the WTO-DSB has regarded as a strategy based on prudence 206
and more recently as a general principle of international law.2 07
In the Japan-Apples dispute,208 the appellant, Japan, challenged
the panel's description of Article 5.7209 as accommodating only
situations of "new uncertainty," and leaving no room for "unresolved
uncertainty."210 The appellate body disagreed, stating:
The Panel's statement that Article 5.7 is intended to
address 'situations where little, or no, reliable evidence
was available on the subject matter at issue', refers to the
availability of reliable evidence. We do not read the Panel's
interpretation as excluding cases where the available
evidence is more than minimal in quantity, but has not led
to reliable or conclusive results.2 11
The value of this clarification lies in its identification of "reliability"
and "conclusiveness" as the sought-after features of scientific
evidence that the SPS Agreement attempts to harness (in the context
of a state's ability to unilaterally impose provisional measures
preceding adequate risk assessment). However, such a reading of
Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement ignores the insight that
characteristics like reliability and conclusiveness do not belong to, or
automatically emanate from scientific evidence itself, but reference
the relation of such evidence "to the values of a particular community
in a particular regulatory context." 212 To proceed otherwise would be
to internalize the fallacy, reiterated by the United States' claim in the
206. See BeefHormones, supra note 196,

124; see also discussion in Part I.
207. See Panel Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting the
Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products,
4.523, WT/DS291/R,
WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R (Sept. 29, 2006) (adopted Nov. 21, 2006) [hereinafter
Biotech Products].
208. See Appellate Body Report, Japan-MeasuresAffecting the Importation of

Apples, WT/DS245/AB/R (Nov. 26, 2003) [hereinafter Japan-Apples].
209. The WTO-DSB Panel described this as involving "situations where little, or
no, reliable evidence was available . . . ." Id. 183.
210. Id. Japan argues that both "new uncertainty" and "unresolved uncertainty"
fall under Article 5.7 of the SPS, and that the Panel, in excluding the latter, erred as
a matter of law.
211. Id. 1 185 (emphasis in original).
212. David Winickoff et al., Adjudicating the GM Food Wars: Science, Risk, and
Democracy in World Trade Law, 30 YALE J. INT'L L. 81, 113 (2005).
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213

Japan-Apples case,
that some science is based on objective
standards while others are purely socially determined.2 14
The application of precautionary measures, however, is only
allowed upon a successful showing that the existing scientific
evidence is insufficient to allow for an appropriate assessment of the
*216
potential risks, 215 and not on a more general basis.
Accordingly,
whether or not a precautionary approach is mandated as part of
customary international law is of little consequence given that SPS
binds the legality of this approach to a state party's ability to show
insufficiency of scientific evidence or otherwise proceed towards
conducting an adequate risk assessment.217 The WTO-DSB and the
ICJ (in the Gab&kovo-Nagymaros dispute) are aligned on this issue.
213. Japan-Apples, supra note 208,

64:

With respect to the concept of "unresolved uncertainty," the
United States claims that the examples of "unresolved
uncertainty" cited by Japan "do not even constitute relevant
scientific evidence." The statements of caution by the experts,
according to the United States, were based on policy judgments
rather than scientific considerations, as the experts themselves
acknowledged.
214. Specifically with respect to the SPS Agreement, see Winickoff et al., supra
note 212, at 91-92, 96-97 (describing how "regulatory systems are characterized
by particular 'cultures of rationality."'). More generally on the issue of objectivity
and value orientation in scientific research, see THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE
OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (3rd ed. 1996) arguing that only problems for which
solutions can be anticipated within pre-set paradigms constitute "normal" research
problems.
215. See Japan-Apples, supra note 208,

143-168, 175-185; SPS, supra note

203, art. 5.7, elaborated on in WTO Analytical Index: Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures, WORLD TRADE ORG.
185, http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/
booksp_e/analyticindex_e/sps_01_e.htm (last visited May 31, 2014) [hereinafter
WTO AnalyticalIndex].

216. As was the outcome in Beef Hormones, where the WTO-DSB rejected the
European Commission's claim to apply precautionary measures under Article 5.1
of the SPS expressly requiring a risk assessment. See Beef Hormones, supra note
196,

125; see also Panel Report, Australia-MeasuresAffecting Importation of

Salmon, at 154,

8.57, WT/DS18/AB/R (Feb. 13, 1988) [hereinafter Australia-

Salmon]:

[T]he reference contained in Article 5.1 to base sanitary measures
on an assessment 'as appropriate to the circumstances' cannot, in
our view, annul or supersede the substantive obligation resting on
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But where the ICJ's decision influenced through implication, the
WTO-DSB's approach to risk assessment, sets into motion a global
process of standardization218 drawing on the methodologies,
assumptions, and practices of a variety of international institutions219
and related mechanisms 220 to demand precise and comprehensive
scientific risk assessments even when a state's actions are clearly

Australia to base the sanitary measure in dispute... on a risk
assessment. We consider that the reference 'as appropriate to the
circumstances' relates, rather, to the way in which such risk
assessment has to be carried out. Only Article 5.7 allows for an
exception to the obligation to base sanitary measures on a risk
assessment.
217. See WTO Analytical Index, supra note 215,

287-302. The SPS requires

state parties to self-determine their respective upper ("appropriate") threshold of
protection preceding any actual "SPS measure" being imposed. See AustraliaSalmon, supra note 216,

202; see also SPS, supra note 203, arts. 4.1, 5.4, 5.6

(which function under the belief that a state has already chosen an appropriate level
of protection); Australia-Salmon,supra,

205; BeefHormones, supra note 196,

124 ("[T]he precautionary principle does not, by itself, and without a clear textual
directive to that effect, relieve a Panel from the duty of applying the normal (i.e.,
customary international law) principles of treaty interpretation in reading the
provisions of the SPS Agreement.") (emphasis removed); Biotech Products, supra
note 207,
7.3065; see also Laurent A. Ruessmann, Putting the Precautionary
Principle in Its Place: Parametersfor the ProperApplication of a Precautionary
Approach and the Implicationsfor Developing States in the Light of the Doha WTO
Ministerial, 17 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 905, 935-37 (2002).

218. For example, the International Standards for Phytosanitary Measures, No.
11 developed under the PEST RISK ANALYSIS FOR QUARANTINE PESTS INCLUDING
ANALYSIS OF ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS AND LIVING MODIFIED ORGANISMS (2004)
(prepared by the Secretariat of the International Plant Protection Convention, 2006)
requiring that every potential invasive species of pests be identified and detailed as
part of risk assessment efforts. See also AQUATIC ANIMAL HEALTH CODE 2010, ch.
2.2 (developed by the World Organization for Animal Health, Paris, 2010)
("Import Risk Analysis"). With respect to the WTO-DSB's endorsement of similar
standards, see Japan-Apples, supra note 208, 196.
219. See, e.g., The International Plant Protection Convention, Annex A, art. 3(c),
Nov. 17 1997, [2005] A.T.S. 23; SPS, supra note 203, Annex A, art. 3(b);
International Agreement for the Creation at Paris of an International Office for
Dealing with Contagious Diseases of Animals, and Annex, Jan. 25, 1924, [1925]
A.T.S. 15.
220. See, e.g., SPS, supra note 203, arts. 2.2, 3.2, 5.1.
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motivated by precautionary thinking.221 But, in this context, the
search for reliability and conclusiveness of available scientific
evidence does not animate risk assessment efforts. Rather, in JapanApples, the WTO-DSB categorically rejected Japan's argument (that
its evaluation of scientific evidence be considered in the context of
that country's historic attitude and methodology regarding issues of
risk), with respect to Article 2.2 of the SPS,222 by reasoning that the
Panel (from whose decision Japan had appealed) correctly interpreted
"sufficient" in Article 2.2 as implying a "rational or objective
relationship between the measure [being applied] and the relevant
scientific evidence [used to justify the measure]." 223 As such, the
WTO-DSB appears to be philosophically bound to the presumption
that a state can necessarily find and supply scientific evidence that is
sufficiently certain- to justify precautionary
measures. 224- This
counterintuitive interpretation formally reconciles what I have
described as the "explicit" (rhetorical) and "implicit" (actual)
interpretations of precaution. 225
A high-risk assessment threshold is designed to prevent states from
unilaterally applying environmental measures to thwart preexisting
trade commitments. 226 Reasoning backwards we might conclude that
how certainly and sufficiency are understood is structured by a
world-view that views trade inspired economic growth, and
environmental protection, as complementary goals up to the point

221. See Australia-Salmon, supra note 216,
112-115; see also Steve
Charnovitz, The Supervision of Health and Biosafety Regulation by World Trade
Rules, 13 TULANE ENVTL. L.J. 271, 290 (2000).
222. See SPS, supra note 203, art. 2.2, which states: "Members shall ensure that

[every SPS] measure is ... based on scientific principles and is not maintained
without sufficient scientific evidence, except as provided for in paragraph 7 of
Article 5." See also Japan-Apples,supra note 208,
175-185.
223. See Japan-Apples, supra note 208,

162-163.

224. For a detailed critique, see Amicus Curiae Brief of Center for International
Environmental Law et al., European Communities-Measures Affecting the
Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products 37 (WT/DS/291, 292, 293) (June 1,
2004), http://www.ciel.org/Publications/ECBiotechAmicusBrief 2JuneO4.pdf; see
also Winickoff et al., supra note 212, at 81-123.
225. See Jacqueline Peel, Precaution-A Matter of Principle, Approach or
Process?, 5 MELBOURNE J. INT'L. L. 483, 489 (2004); see also Marchant, supra

note 22, at 1799, 1800.
226. See SPS, supra note 203, art. 2.3; see also Charnovitz, supra note 221, at
271-72.

2014] PRECAUTIONARYAPPROACHES TO SUSTAINABILITY

605

Given the wide
where the former interests may be jeopardized.
contemporary acceptance of the ethos of Sustainable Development,
such an alliance of interests is reminiscent of post-WWII Germany's
use of precaution and situates the WTO as the new motor globalizing
a depoliticized interpretation precaution.
But if the precautionary relationship continues to be interpreted
through the lens of Sustainable Development, it is uncertain what
will become of treaties like the Convention on Biological
Diversity,228 widely held to be a revolutionary advancement in
environmental protection for its foregrounding of precaution as a first
principle.2 2 9

227. In its Report on Japan-Apples, supra note 208, the WTO-DSB Appellate
Body discussed and affirmed its reasoning in the earlier BeefHormones, supra note
196,
123-125, reiterating:
In EC-Hormones, the Appellate Body noted that the
"precautionary principle" had not yet attained "authoritative
formulation" outside the field of international environmental law,
but that it remained relevant in the context of the SPS
Agreement, particularly as recognized in certain provisions of
that Agreement. However, the Appellate Body found that the
'precautionary principle' did not release Members from their
WTO obligations and, as such, did not 'override the provisions of
Articles 5.1 and 5.2 of the SPS Agreement ....
Japan-Apples, supra note 208,

233.

228. See Convention on Biological Diversity, art. 6, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S.
79 (entered into force Dec. 29, 1993) [hereinafter CBD]. Over 190 countries are
party to this convention.
229. See Guiding Principle 1 ("Precautionary Approach") in Conference of the
Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Sixth Meeting, The Hague,
Neth., April 7-19, 2002, Report of the Sixth Meeting of the Conference of the
Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Guiding Principles for the
Prevention, Introduction and Mitigation of Impacts of Alien Species that Threaten
Ecosystems, Habitats or Species, 249, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/6/20 (Sept. 23,

2002), referencing Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration,supra note 3. Even though
the precautionary language found in the Rio Declaration differs from the CBD, the
wider interpretation of precautionary action pervades both treaties. See, e.g., CBD,
supra note 228, art. 8(h) (foregrounding obstruction/eradication of alien biological
species that threaten local biodiversity).
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C. Structured Confusion and the Displacement ofDecision
Despite its reputation as a union at the forefront of global
environmental consciousness,
the European
Commission's
Communication of February 2000230 (Communication) is a telling
document for the ways in which it structures confusing rationales and
contradictory strategies into a single positive, even identityforming, 231 position. 232 The European Commission (Commission)
understands precaution as applying to situations where scientific
evaluation has indicated the presence of risks worth fearing.
Accordingly, the Communication states:
When decision-makers become aware of a risk to the
environment or human, animal or plant health that in the
event of non-action may have serious consequences, the
question of appropriate protective measures arise.
Decisionmakers have to obtain, through a structured
approach, a scientific evaluation, as complete as possible,
of the risk to the environment, or health, in order to select
the most appropriate course of action ...
The decision to wait or not to wait for new scientific data
before considering possible measures should be taken by
the decision-makers with a maximum of transparency. The
absence of scientific proof of the existence of a causeeffect relationship,
a
quantifiable
dose/response
relationship or a quantitative evaluation of the probability
of the emergence of adverse effects following exposure
should not be used to justify inaction. Even if scientific
advice is supported only by a minority fraction of the
scientific community, due account should be taken of their
views, provided the credibility and reputation of this
fraction are recognized .... 233

230. See Communication, supra note 5.
231. Dratwa,supra note 107, at 281-83.

232. For a similar story in the context of national courts internalizing Sustainable
Development, see Bandopadhyay, supra note 66.
233. Id. §§ 6.1, 6.2 (citing Beef Hormones, supra note 196, 124: "In some
cases, the very existence of divergent views presented by qualified scientists who
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Given the earlier analysis, I would suggest that the Commission's
position and confidence in the WTO Appellate Body's decision in
Beef Hormones are overly optimistic. Further, the Commission's
formal elevation of minority knowledges and diverse opinions
notwithstanding, the Communication commences by emphasizing
that "[a]ny assessment of risk that is made should be based on the
existing body of scientific and statistical data."2 34 This delayed caveat
must, in turn, be read together with the affirmation that:
[R]eliance on the precautionary principle is no excuse for
derogating from the general principles of risk management.
These general principles include: proportionality, nondiscrimination, consistency, examination of the benefits
and costs of action or lack of action, examination of
235
scientific developments.
Despite the wealth of lessons that may be drawn from the brief but
significant reign of neo-liberalism, such general principles continue
to stack standardized knowledges and de-contextualized best
practices against the experiential knowledge and desiderata of local,
potentially affected, communities.236 For this reason, ten of the
twelve lessons drawn by the authors of a seminal anthology on
unsuccessful precautionary governance, call for decision-makers to
reexamine what kinds of information they consider valuable when
making risk assessments. In particular, the authors recommend
paying attention to "the assumptions and values of different social
groups."237 The Commission responds to such concerns by stressing
formal transparency of decision-making, and early and reasonable
public participation and consultation. 238 But formal transparency,
public participation and consultation, while once fashionable, have
been shown to be unequal to the task of guiding political and
have investigated the particular issue at hand, may indicate a state of scientific
uncertainty .... ).
234. Communication, supra note 5,

§ 1 (emphasis added).

235. Id. § 6.3 ("The general principles of application").
236. See, e.g., Gobind Nankani, Foreword to ROBERTO
BANK, ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE

1990s:

ZAGHA ET AL., WORLD

LEARNING FROM A DECADE OF REFORM,

at xiii (2005).
237. See LATE LESSONS, supra note 123, at 186, 187-215, 548.
238. Communication, supra note 5, § 5.

608

FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XXV

economic inertia.239 Additionally, buzzwords like transparency,
participation, and openness often inspire less comprehensive
accounts of risks that merely emphasize positive, standardized
knowledge.
Claude Levi-Strauss describes the background conditions leading
up to simplified positive knowledge by explaining that while
scientific thought can tolerate uncertainty and frustration, it cannot
abide disorder and chaos. Modern taxonomy supplies simplifications,
painting a structure onto reality complete with horizons and frontiers,
without acknowledging that the entire purpose of such ordering is to
allow us to make decisions despite uncertainty chaos.240 Similarly,
contemporary interpretations of precaution that emphasize
knowledge pre-qualifications, accept such horizons as real and
implement legal presumptions against precautionary governance in
anticipation of assurances that may never arrive.
Asking for diversification of knowledge bases should not,
however, be viewed as a call to relativism. As Robert Sack has noted,
"truth, justice, and the natural are contextual, but not relative." 241
Cultural understandings of risk not only have a politics but also a
history 242 that is passed down, often orally, as a kind of institutional
memory. So, for instance, with respect to their study of ocean policy,
David Gee et al. note that "the views of local interest groups are not
necessarily identical to their national or international equivalents, be
these, for example, environmental non-governmental organizations or
industry." 243 Similarly, Robert Stallings has stressed the continued
existence of heterogeneity of beliefs within social movements by
showing that internal structures underlying such movements do more
to motivate participants, than pre-existing or initial consensus as is
often assumed. 244 Sheila Jasanoff renders such complex interactions
239. See Brian Wynne, Sheep Farming after Chernobyl, 31 ENV'T 10 (1989),
available at http://engl.iastate.edu/prog rams/rhetoric/areas/rst/readinggroup/pdf
wynnel989.pdf.
240. LEVI-STRAUSS, supra note 34, at 9.
241. Robert D. Sack, A Sketch of a GeographicTheory of Morality, 89 ANNALS
Ass'N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 26, 26 (1999).
242. See Wynne, supra note 239; JASANOFF, supra note 92, at 258.
243. LATE LESSONS, supra note 123, at 188.
244. See Stallings, supra note 62, at 475-77. For a classic description of intragroup heterogeneity, see, e.g., MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION (A. M. Henderson & Talcott Parsons trans., Talcott
Parsons ed., 2012) (1947).
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discernible under the heading of "civic epistemology," which she
defines as "the institutionalized practices by which members of a
given society test and deploy knowledge claims used as a basis for
making collective choices."245 For the purposes of this discussion, it
is enough that public understandings of risk can be broadly sketched
for the consideration of, say, municipal policy-makers and more
often, dispute resolution bodies.246 Methodologies like civic
epistemology and "thick description" 247 provide a rich matrix of
considerations within which policy-makers may test their rationale.
Such methodologies also run against generalized knowledge-claims
that consider emphasis on the local to be primitive, 248 and often
blame the public for not understanding the science involved.2 49
The decentralization inherent in Jasanoff and Clifford Geertz's
methodologies is compatible with the Commission's assertion that
"[tihe appropriate response in a given situation is thus the result of an
eminently political decision, a function of the risk level that is
'acceptable' to the society on which the risk is imposed." 250 This is
not to say that municipal political decisionism is easily achieved; the
World Bank, for instance, has noted that "National governments may
be reluctant to challenge those who cause environmental damage;
they are likely to be rich and influential, while those who suffer most
are often the poor and powerless."2 5 1 Ironically, one of the greatest
threats to political decision in favor of precautionary governance
comes from the "general principles of risk management"252 imposed
by supranational bodies like the Commission, the World Bank and
the WTO. While a detailed discussion of these principles is more
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

See JASANOFF, supra note 92, at 255.
Id. at 258-71.
See CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 15-16 (1973).
See LfVI-STRAUSS, supra note 34, at 1-30.
See JASANOFF, supra note 92, at 270 (arguing that dismissing public opinion

as ignorant of relevant science "diminishes civic agency, erases history, neglects
culture, and privileges people's knowledge of isolated facts (or their ignorance of
such facts) over their mastery of more complex frames of meaning ... [such
justification] make[s] no room for the multivalency of interpretation.").
250. Communication, supra note 5, § 5.2.1 ("The decision whether or not act").
251. See JAMES M. CYPHER & JAMES L. DIETZ, THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT 62 (3rd ed. 2009) (citing WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT
REPORT 1992: DEVELOPMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1992)).
252. Communication, supra note 5, § 6.3 ("The general principles of

application").
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than can be accommodated here, it will suffice to note that because
these "general principles" exist to prevent protectionist trade between
WTO members, they already draw power away from local
communities and their national leaders into an undemocratic and
-253
increasingly centralized international economic system.
For
instance, if the WTO-DSB insists that environmental concerns are
distinct from and should be independent of economic concerns, and
that this distinction is to be objectively determined by an
unaccountable supranational adjudicatory institutions based on
standardized expertise bearing no relation to the people affected, then
what remains of the Community's assurance that an "appropriate
response . . . is . . . a function of the risk level that is 'acceptable' to

the society on which the risk is imposed"? 2 54
The endlessly interconnected and unbounded nature of
environmental impacts implies that while obtaining a sense of local,
public understandings of risk is important, it is not sufficient. Within
this preference for privileging locally sourced precautionary
decisions, priority must be given to measures that favor
environmental protection. What this means will, of course, vary from
case to case, but in the event of conflict between the two (say, for a
society that has never really cared for local ecological health, and
doesn't appear to be changing its mind), decisions in favor of
environmental protection should hold sway. While such an approach
may at first seem oppressive, even a cursory review of the
development of state responsibility in international law shows a
marked shift in this direction, from statist values (e.g., The
Convention on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources)255
toward the globalization of liability for adverse transboundary
256
impact.
Again, my argument asks only that we privilege
precautionary decisions and then test such decisions against the
253. See, e.g., B. S. Chimni, International Institutions Today: An Imperial
Global State in the Making, 15 EUR. J. INT'L. L. 1 (2004). For an ethnographic,
experiential critique, see HELENA NORBERG-HODGE, ANCIENT FUTURES: LEARNING
FROM LADAKH FOR A GLOBALIZING WORLD 2, 50-51, 115-32 (1991).
254. Communication, supra note 5, § 5.2.1 ("The decision whether or not to
act").
255. See Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, G.A.

Res. 1803 (XVII), U.N. GAOR, 7th Sess., Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc. A/5217, at 15
(Dec. 14, 1962).
256. PATRICIA BIRNIE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT
128-90 (3rd ed. 2009).
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bedrock of an emerging culture favoring ecological health for its own
sake; where "own sake" includes, but is not limited to, human
sustenance interests. Even in a situation where a new technology is
the cause of concern, "new," must be construed in terms of a
dynamic relationship between a particular society and its environs.
Political decisionism is, in turn, itself structured by experience and
perspective. How we perceive the world and value ourselves in
relation, determines what we deem worth deciding and therefore,
how we decide. This lesson is eloquently captured by Gee et al.
when, in insisting that institutions learn to recognize not only
uncertainty but also ignorance, they explain that:
[E]thical boundaries of acknowledged responsibility about
the consequences of human innovative commitments have
been drawn by scientific knowledge. Any possible
consequence which lies beyond existing scientific
knowledge and predictability is deemed by definition to be
beyond responsibility. This is defined as such even though
it is known that such surprises will occur as a result of
choices and commitments. The precautionary principle
implies the needs, as a matter of cultural change, for
society's institutions to enlarge existing notions of ethical
responsibility to encompass these unknowns, which are
predictable in principle even though not in specifics.257
A moral commitment to a precautionary relationship with the natural
environment, is mostly ether unless supported by humility and a
curative psychology that encourages a self-critical sense of
responsibility.
IV.

PUBLIC UNDERSTANDINGS OF MODERN RISK AND THE ETHICAL
OBLIGATION TO INQUIRE INTO THEIR CREATION

In order to consider how such a curative ethic may organically take
hold in a modern society, it is important to appreciate that ecological
movements often manifest as culturally attuned experiential
responses to reflexive risks. Risk is not a "thing" with some
independent existence outside of culture. Rather, risk is
257. LATE LESSONS, supra note 123, at 189.
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fundamentally an existential and moral concern, and its creation and
distribution presuppose value choices. Consequently, all
conversations about risk are also non-conversations about the
existing distributions of power, or, as Charles Perrow pointedly
states, "the power to impose risks on the many for the benefit of the
few." 258
A.

Public UnderstandingsofRisk

The displacement of decision is visible in the struggles of
sovereign nations before international institutions like the WTO, but
also in the everyday lives of citizens. With local decision-making and
mutual aid being continually replaced by dependence on international
institutions with globalizing "best practice" norms, citizens feel
powerless to make decisions or even pose difficult questions about
issues that directly impact their lives. Consequently, "at all levels,
passivity, even apathy, is setting in; people are abdicating personal

responsibility." 259

In order to retain an interest in participating in political decisions,
people must see themselves as responsible moral actors rather than
mere consumers with freedom, where freedom is understood as the
rapid satisfaction of wants, and responsibility is merely "a paradigm
of insurance [that] assumes the logic of loss compensation."260 This
trend applies both within the context of institutions and with respect
to individuals at large. For instance, if we simply rewarded
government officials for performing honestly in activities that can be
monitored (instead of emphasizing the pride involved in public
service as part of their training), they may feel no intrinsic urge to
carry such behavior to other responsibilities that are difficult to
monitor. Such opportunism is inevitable because the reward strategy
makes officials "feel that they are not trusted as 'moral' agents
anymore and therefore that they are under no moral obligation to
behave morally unless they are forced to do so." 26 1 Similarly, the
258. PERROW, supra note 56, at 306.
259. See NORBERG-HODGE, supra note 253, at 123.
260. Frangois Ewald, The Return ofDescartes'sMalicious Demon: An Outline of
a Philosophy of Precaution (Stephen Utz trans.), in EMBRACING RISK 273, 274

(Tom Baker & Jonathon Simon eds., 2002).
261. See Ha-Joon Chang, Breaking the Mould: An Institutional Political
Economy Alternative to the Neo-Liberal Theory of the Market and the State, 26
CAMBRIDGE J. EcON. 539, 555 (2002).
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pursuit of moral responsibility cannot merely be limited to
institutions because in a socio-economic context that treats individual
preferences as the ultimate markers, while institutions may have
some success in shaping observable behavior, they can rarely alter
motivations and perceptions more generally. 262 Accordingly, it may
be possible, subtly263 or by decree, to get people to buy product A
and not B, but not reconsiderwhether they should be buying at all.264
To the contrary, treating citizens as consumers favors a centralization
of culture and contributes to insecurity and passivity on the part of
people everywhere. 265 Freedom cannot only refer to the satisfaction
of personal needs and wants. It must include the ability to take
responsibility or as Tribe put it: "to choose what we shall value . . . to

feel coherence over time and community." 266 Contemporary
interpretations of precaution, actively hamper such consciousness
formation because the overriding goal of Sustainable Development
cannot be used to question where and how modern risks are created
and distributed. Precaution understood as a moral relationalarticulation counters such passivity by bringing crucial decisions
back into a locally comprehensible, existentially grounded context.
Even now, when a deep-sea oilrig ruptures, the focus is on damage
control, some form of insurance-funded restitution (though this is
rarely possible), and much regulatory commotion. Yet, this charge
has rarely led to a comprehensive interrogation of the presence of
oilrigs themselves-a charge still dismissed as impractical. At the
other extreme, in many countries the conversation has long shifted to
nuclear power as the only practical way toward clean, eco-friendly
energy. This choice, of course, downplays the incommensurable risks
involved and continues to rely on techno-scientific modernization as
the only practical way forward. For this reason, conversations about
technical aspects of nuclear power often draw focus from considering
what the shift to nuclear says about the role of industrial production,
consumption, and waste in advancing an ecological downturn. My
concern, that this shift handicaps the individual's need to take stock
262. Id.
263. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 185-200 (2008).

264. For an extensive critique of the money economy, see, e.g.,
DEBT: THE FIRST 5,000 YEARS (2011).
265. See NORBERG-HODGE, supra note

253, at 123.
266. See Tribe, supra note 18, at 1326-27, 1337-38.
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of his role in relation to the environment, is captured by Langdon
Winner when he explains that, by far:
By far the greatest latitude of choice exists the very first
time a particular instrument, system, or technique is
introduced. Because choices tend to become strongly fixed
in material equipment, economic investment, and social
habit, the original flexibility vanishes for all practical
purposes once the initial commitments are made. 267
Closely aligned with such a spirit of denial is an emphasis on
technological innovation as a universal salve that Jared Diamond
astutely counts as a popular "one-liner objection." 268 The technologyas-savior attitude closely mimics the reliance on positive scientific
knowledge as the way out of uncertainty. The resulting claims often
proceed as if future innovations will bear no relation to the history of
modernization that precaution has responded to; 269 they forget that
technological innovation does not develop along a linear progress
narrative directed toward problem-solving, but does generate social
costs270 and new risks.271 Parallel to technology-as-savior objections
are generalizations of the kind reflected in the "Environmental
Kuznets Curve." 272 The central claim of this graphic is that poorer
267. See LANGDON WINNER, Do Artifacts Have Politics?, in THE WHALE AND
THE REACTOR: A SEARCH FOR LIMITS IN AN AGE OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY 19, 29

(1986).
268. JARED DIAMOND, COLLAPSE: How SOCIETIES CHOOSE To FAIL OR SURVIVE
504-05 (2005).
269. Id. at 505 ("All our current problems are unintended negative consequences
of our existing technology. The rapid advances in technology during the 20th
century have been creating difficult new problems faster than they have been
solving old problems .... .").

270. See, e.g., Lewis Mumford, Authoritarianand Democratic Technics, 5 TECH.
& CULTURE 1 (1964); Friedrich Engels, On Authority, in THE MARX-ENGELS

731 (Robert C. Tucker ed., Samuel Moore trans., 3rd ed., 1978); Shiv
Visvanathan, On the Annals of the Laboratory State in Science, in HEGEMONY AND
VIOLENCE: A REQUIEM FOR MODERNITY 257 (Ashis Nandy ed., 1988).
READER

271. See BECK, supra note 23; DIAMOND, supra note 268, at 504 (pointing to the

destructive history of chlorofluorocarbons and automobiles, the latter being an
instance of technology which we have chosen to retain and make nearindispensable despite being aware of their underlying costs).
272. See CYPHER & DIETZ, supra note 251, at 57-58.
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societies value a clean environment less than wealthier societies and
environmental pollution is therefore a temporary (but necessary) cost
of development which plateaus at a threshold level of per capita
income (before dipping).273 The underlying assumption, however, is
based on culturally biased notions of rationality and value that are
simply not applicable to poor, but arguably eco-friendly cultures all
over the world. 274 Further, Simon Kuznets's thesis remains severely
limited in its appeal because it cannot, for instance, cover the
unbounded
intra/inter-connected
repercussions
of adverse
275
environmental impact,
nor speak to an expanding body of
pollutants (for instance, while a wealthier society may reject
industrial sulphur dioxide but embrace consumerism, thereby
incurring additional waste). Finally, the curve cannot conceive of the
cultural and psycho-social implications of its claim: a generalized
abdication of responsibility by citizens accompanied by the
privatization of clean-up efforts funded by an elite, which returns us
to the insight that risk is never equally distributed in a society.
However, faith in such generic models of progress have inspired
third-world nations to demand that they too receive the same
opportunities for industrial development as the northern nations
enjoyed in the past.276 The hard truth, however, is that the nearendless time and resource horizons, necessary to achieve such catchup development, do not exist.277
In failing to recognize precaution as an ethical reckoning, citizens
ignore important questions about the world and consequently pursue
a far less demanding quest for their place in it. Merely by calling a
project "sustainable" or "best practices compliant" begins to imply
that such activities have passed through some thoughtful, contextspecific, and democratized form of consideration, and this
273. See id. at 62.

274. See Gallup Poll, supra note 50, at 7-15, 33-39. Analysis of the Gallup Poll
indicates that even the poor and underprivileged see the protection of life
supporting environmental attributes/processes as crucial. For a graphical analysis of
the Gallup Poll, see O'Riordan & Jordan, supra note 10, at 203-04.
275. See CYPHER & DIETZ, supra note 251, at 57-62.
276. Economic development theories of every ideological shade shares the vision
of development through expansive industrialization and "growth." See CYPHER &
DIETZ, supra note 251, chs. 3-9; see also GERALD M. MEIER, BIOGRAPHY OF A
SUBJECT: AN EVOLUTION OF DEVELOPMENT EcoNoMICs chs. 7, 8. (2005).
277. BROWN, supra note 70, at 3-72; NORBERG-HODGE, supra note 253, at 14156.
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assumption in turn inspires a positive emotional response.278
Emotional highs, in turn, stimulate complacency, the abdication of
personal responsibility, and draw attention away from the need for
close scrutiny of hazards underlying lifestyles that have been taken
for granted. When, on the other hand, such challenges arise as vague,
old-hat contestations about transparency and consultation, public
scrutiny is primed to be satisfied by little more than a vague,
standard-format mea culpa, and technologies are found, transplanted
as boilerplate, and quickly turn afait accompli.279 Perrow notes how,
in response to queries about the intergenerational risks of nuclear
power plants, a United States' governmental report on "safety goals"
acknowledged the unavoidability of said risks, but then explained
that such risks could be avoided by guarding against accidentsthereby answering an inquiry about the consequences of possible
accidents by urging calm on the grounds that accidents will be
prevented.280
Finally, endemic "organized irresponsibility" 281 has other insidious
long-term implications that are so diffuse as to make allocating blame
on an after-the-fact polluter pays basis virtually impossible. Attesting
to such enormous but often unobserved implications, John Walden
writes:

278. The same objection could, of course, be made with respect to a rigid
enforcement of formal precaution. See infra CONCLUSION.
279. Accordingly, Winner insists:
Consciously or unconsciously, deliberately or inadvertently,
societies choose structures for technologies that influence how
people are going to work, communicate, travel, consume, and so
forth over a very long time. In the processes by which structuring
decisions are made, different people are situated differently and
possess unequal degrees of power as well as unequal levels of
awareness ... In that sense technological innovations are similar
to legislative acts or political foundings that establish a
framework for public order that will endure over many
generations.
WINNER, supra note 267, at
280. PERROW, supra note

28-29.
56, at 69.

281. ULRICH BECK, WORLD AT RISK 194 (2009); see also BECK, supra note 23,

at 50.
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Every generation takes the natural environment it
encounters during childhood as the norm against which it
measures environmental decline later in life. With each
ensuing generation, environmental degradation generally
increases, but each generation takes that degraded
condition as the new normal. Scientists call this
phenomenon "shifting baselines" or "inter-generational
amnesia," and it is part of a larger and more nebulous
reality-the insidious ebbing of the ecological and social
relevancy of declining and disappearing species.
My colleague, Karin E. Limburg, and I have come up
with another term for the broader context of this
phenomenon: "eco-social anomie." Anomie is defined as a
state or condition of individuals or society characterized by
a breakdown of social priorities and values. Eco-social
anomie describes a biological and cultural feedback loop
that spirals toward this breakdown: As species disappear,
they lose relevance to a society and a constituency to
champion their revival. 282
B. Asking after Risk

In order to develop a self-critical sense of how people decide what
to value, decision-makers must begin by reconsidering what they
know of, and how they feel about, existing innovations. From this
vantage, it is counterproductive to think of precautionary governance
as functioning in service of Sustainable Development because then
environmental problems are always already framed in one particular
manner283 resulting in policies that can claim to resolve problems
without challenging the lifestyles within which such risks are created
and recur. The decisions of the ICJ and the WTO-DSB that
exemplify such framing have been used by commentators and
policymakers to propose that since precautionary governance is
282. John Waldman, The Natural World Vanishes: How Species Cease to
Matter, YALE ENV'T 360 (Apr. 8, 2010), http://e360.yale.edu/content/

feature.msp?id=2258.
283. See, e.g., ERVING GOFFMAN, FRAME ANALYSIS 21 (1974); see also Sheila
Jasanoff, The Idiom of Co-production, in STATES OF KNOWLEDGE 1 (Sheila
Jasanoff ed., 2004); LATOUR, supra note 14, at 1-5; Delaney, supra note 108, at
488.
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defined by uncertainty, precautionary measures need be considered
only when uncertainties continue to persist.2 84 While intended as a
defense of precautionary governance, this claim is severely
dependant on a linear reading of how dangers come about or are
discovered,28 5 why they may be ignored as incomprehensible or
merely noise. 286 Summarizing this concern in one of his sparkling
analogies, Arne Naess writes, "any article of docta ignorantia, or
agnosticism is embedded in Gnosticism or dogmatism. . . . As soon

as it [ignorance etc.] is about something, a piece of ignorance is like
a hole in a Swiss cheese-it is only there because of the cheese
around it."287
A greater weakness of limiting precaution to instances of knownuncertainty is that even after being delimited from prevention (i.e.,
when the risk is known), precautionary governance only seeks to
guard against future risks while uncritically accepting existing,
increasingly complex technologies and the corresponding psychosocial attitudes, from which said risks emanate. Recall, the efforts of
the Board of Health and the Sewer Commission, in John Snow's
London, to acquit the interconnected sewer system of all blame 288a
move that Howard Brody et al. was essential to "allay public
fears." 289 Similarly, when environmental governance in post-war
Germany was operationalized on the platform that economic
development and environmental protection are naturally harmonious,
284. See Trouwborst, supra note 7, at 117 (quoting N. Haigh, The Introduction of
the PrecautionaryPrinciple into the UK, in INTERPRETING THE PRECAUTIONARY
PRINCIPLE (Timothy 0' Riordan & James Cameron eds., 1994): "[O]nce all
uncertainty has been removed, 'precaution is no longer the right word."').
285. For a discussion of ignorance and uncertainty, and how the Precautionary
Principle "leaves us bound by present knowledge," see Marchant, supra note 22, at
1800.
286. See PERROW, supra note 56, at 23-31, describing "incomprehensibility" as
an common ingredient behind the failure of interactively complex systems.
287. See NAESS, supra note 71, at 147. The block of cheese may be called
perspective, viewpoint, worldview, frames, system etc., but all discourse (or
silence) needs some larger, at least somewhat understood, body of
beliefs/knowledge within which to exist and find meaning.
288. See Brody et al., supra note 131, quoting the Chairmen of the Sewers
Commission statement to The Times of London as saying, "[T]he sewers were not
the cause of the cholera; that they were not in any way connected with the disease;
but that the real cause of the calamitous occurrences in the locality . . . was the

filthy and undrained state of the houses."
2 89. Id.
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not only did the government shore up constitutional authority, but it
also negated the ontological basis for scrutiny along the lines
proposed by Beck when he writes:
Risk may be defined as a systematic way of dealing with
hazards and insecurities induced and introduced by
modernization itself. Risks, as opposed to older dangers,
are consequences which relate to the threatening force of
modernization and to its globalization of doubt. They are
politically reflexive.2 90
In post-WWII Germany, political parties of varied ideological
shades were able to preempt challenges to modernization precisely
because they publicly assumed a natural and positive mutuality
between the modernization policies and environmental health. This
strategy allowed politicians to argue that while many risks existed
and damage had been done, the pursuit of modernization was not to
blame. Similarly, in pursuing Sustainable Development uncritically,
decision-makers neglect the causes of dangers, the politics of
ignorance, 291 while buying into the idea that economic growth and
environmental protection are naturally harmonious.292 The resulting
image portrays a world filled with mysterious, and unforeseeable,
293
As in Snow's London and postwar
i.e., pre-legitimated dangers.
Germany, publics remain in the dark, governments arrogate
authority, and precaution becomes a vacant shell bandied about by all
manner of interests,294 viewed as fatalistic, a catch-all,295 or, at best, a
safety valve.296
290. BECK, supra note 23, at 21 (emphasis removed).
291. See Dovers & Handmer, supra note 24, at 95.
292. BRUNDTLAND COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 20. An even finer point is
placed on this sustainable identity, when, in the Report's Foreword, Brundtland
writes, "the 'environment' is where we all live; and 'development' is what we all
do in attempting to improve our lot within that abode. The two are inseparable." Id.
at xi.
293. BECK, supra note 23, at 34 ("Risks can be legitimated by the fact that one
neither saw nor wanted to see their consequences.").
294. See, e.g., Jonathan Simon, Risk and Reflexivity: What Socio-Legal Studies
Add to the Study ofRisk and the Law, 57 ALA. L. REV. 119, 135-36 (2005) ("[T]he

increasing attention to [catastrophic/environmental] risks is correlated with
declining confidence in the very institutions that the culture of solidarity depended
on: government, large markets, large corporation, and unions.").
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A precautionary approach, as understood in this paper, is an
approach that inquires into the causes of modern risks; demands
introspection about what people consider safe, and how the goal of
Sustainable Development shapes public perception on these issues. I
am, of course, not alone in seeing this potential; O'Riordan and
Jordan, for instance, have written:
But at its core, the precautionary principle provides a direct
challenge to many of the unstated assumptions and ...
"prior commitments" of modern (and particularly
"Western")

societies . . . . In

a

nutshell,

precaution

challenges the established scientific method; it tests the
application of cost benefit analysis in the those [sic] areas
where it is undoubtedly weakest (i.e. situations where
environmental damage may be irreversible or potentially
catastrophic); . . . it challenges politicians to begin thinking

through longer time frames than the next election or
economic recession
... ..297
CONCLUSION: CRISES, COOPERATION, AND SOME CAUTION ABOUT
PRECAUTION

The understanding that environmental hazards will make the world
worse for one and all is perhaps the enduring insight of our times.29 8
295. See O'Riordan & Jordan, supra note 10, at 202 (noting that an increasing
bias toward vulnerability will mean more frequent, expansive invocations of the
Precautionary Principle).
296. See Simon, supra note 294, at 135 (arguing, with respect to development of
workers compensation in early 20th century United States: "to make the work
accident a tolerable loss, insurance and the solidarity culture valorized the
industrial society in which the accidents were embedded. If the accidents were
tolerable, it was because industrial methods were profoundly good for society ...
cancers caused by industrial production (or consumption) did not lend themselves
to the same kind of balancing.").
297. O'Riordan & Jordan, supra note 10, at 192-93.
298. See Stockholm Declaration,supra note 52, pmbl. 2; see also Gallup Poll,
supra note 50, at 6-15, 33-39; BECK, supra note 23, at 23 (describing the
"boomerang effect" of modernization-born risk which "breaks up the pattern of
class and national society. Ecological disaster and atomic fallout," for instance,
"ignore the borders of nations."); Id. at 36, 37-38 ("poverty is hierarchic, smog is
democratic"); see also V. Havel, President of the Czech Republic, Address at the
Opening Ceremony of the Meetings of the International Monetary Fund and the
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But within this frame of reference, research has shown that
environmental hazards disproportionately affect lower classes and
poverty-stricken groups much more immediately and acutely than
they do the wealthy.299 These insights imply that risk must be
investigated at the most decentralized and experiential level possible
because for all practical purposes there is no given distinction
between nature and peoples' culturally-influenced perceptions of
nature.300 Precautionary thinking when viewed as a moral reckoning
calling for direct, even prefigurative political action, does not only
enhance governmental accountability301 but also precipitates an
honest accounting of how everyday choices influence the production
and distribution of risk. This position finds support in David
Winickoff's argument that in situations when certainty based on
gathered knowledge is low, a variety of stakeholders who may
otherwise have been excluded from the debate (in deference to
experts and centralized knowledges) find it easier to have a say and
1
be considered in advance of interventionist decisions. 302 Similarly,
Ellen Hey describes precaution as a decision-making tool integrating
environmental protection with the insufficiency of scientific
knowledge to encourage decision-makers to find less impactful
303
lifestyles,
she is automatically also outlining precaution's
decentralized, democratic, and prefigurative possibilities. In formally
dulling the primacy of scientific evidence, precautionary governance
revises the nature/culture relationship into one that does not disregard
scientific knowledge, but by embracing its shortcomings, allows
technical knowledge to be weighed within the wider field of
democratic-civilian judgment resulting in what has been called "civic
science." 304 O'Riordan and Jordan affirm this position, writing:

World Bank Group (Sept. 26, 2000), available at http://old.hrad.cz/ president/
Havel/speeches/index uk.html.
299. BECK, supra note 23, at 35 ("The history of risk distribution shows that, like
wealth, risks adhere to class pattern, only inversely: wealth accumulates at the top,
risks collect at the bottom . .. risks seem to strengthen, not to abolish, the class
society.").
300. See LATOUR, supra note 14, at 10- 11.
301. See Simon, supra note 294, at 135-36 (describing the sense of "rage" and
"betrayal" felt by victims of environmental hazards, towards their governments).
302. Winickoff et al., supra note 212, at 105.
303. See Hey, supra note 8, at 308.
304. See O'Riordan & Jordan, supra note 10, at 207.
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This [scientists' realization that their findings cannot be
generalized] suggests that the burden of proof of
vulnerability or resilience in natural processes has to fall on
groups outside the science community, such as lawyers,
politicians, active citizens and special interest
groups. 305
The reversed burden of proof implied by a precautionary approach is
indeed an inspired and politically charged innovation,3 0 6 but
unpacking the precautionary relationship is equally if not more
significant as a threat to the complacency of authoritative decisionmaking even when democratically established. The decentralized,
prefigurative power of precaution is by now obvious to
conservationists. 307 But, in suggesting that precaution may be
valuable for more than interrogating economic growth initiatives, I
am also suggesting that precautionary governance should not be
brandished with a rigidity that would forbid loss of biological life
altogether. Jacqueline Peel alludes to this counterintuitive moment,
writing: "The presence of scientific uncertainty . .. becomes an

indicator of the need for a 'precautionary approach' to decisionmaking, but not an automatic trigger for protective measures." 308 On
the one hand, it is unreasonable to view human socio-economic
development as some absurd evil, because not only do "all forms of
life modify their contexts," 3 09 but "life must be lived amidst that
which was made before."3 10 Moreover, if precaution were wielded as
a kind of "disciplinary environmentality" 311 where citizens are
305. Id. at 199.
306. See, e.g., Sven Ove Hansson, Can We Reverse the Burden of Proof?, 90
TOXICOLOGY LETTERS 223, 227-28 (1997) (arguing that it is easier to prove the

presence than the absence of risk).
307. That environmental conservation groups regard precaution with great
respect is well acknowledged. See, e.g., Boehmer-Christiansen, supra note 7, at 38;
Myers, supra note 5, at 212.
308. Peel, supra note 225, at 491; see also Marchant, supra note 22, at 17991800.
309. Lynn White, Jr., The HistoricalRoots of Our Ecological Crisis, 155 SCI.

1203, 1203, available at http://www.uvm.edu/~gflomenh/ENV-NGOPA395/articles/Lynn-White.pdf.
MAG.

310. D. W. Meinig, The Beholding Eye: Ten Versions of the Same Scene, in THE
INTERPRETATION OF ORDINARY LANDSCAPES

33, 44 (D. W. Meinig ed., 1979).

311. See Timothy W. Luke, Environmentality as Green Governmentality, in
DISCOURSES OF THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 80, at 121, 143.
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constantly preoccupied with making human life safer, they would
eventually legitimize governance measures and institutions 312 for no
better reason than their claim to be "precautionary." 313
On the other hand, while a future built around precautionary
relations may seem suspect from an individual freedom standpoint,
this objection takes a particularly narrow and static view of the
future. Social life, after all, is dynamic and perpetually moving in
small, incremental steps in an unimaginable number of directions.
Prioritizing precaution does not mean that everything we know and
everything we are, will be adjudged as wrong and be brought to a
halt. Such a strategy will set a tone whereby the survival of the
natural environment requires that humans, as dominant interveners
within it, display humility while continuing to learn from their
experiences. Precaution must be upheld in opposition to the rhetoric
of Sustainable Development, and instead used to question the
seemingly objective processes through which regulation-focused
decision-makers understand and evaluate the creation of risk. No
serious pursuit of sustainability is possible unless we acknowledge
that the ability to undertake moral choices is crucial to whatever
future we may desire. And if it is a sustainable future we want, then
312. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 13, at 50.

313. See Currie, supra note 100, at 357, n.20 (citing Bundesverwaltungsgericht
[BVerwG] [Federal Administrative Court] Dec. 12 1975, 50 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES
BUNDESVERWALTUNGSGERICHTS 49 (Ger.)). In the Tunneofen case, the owner of a
brick factory in Germany wanted to replace an existing brick kiln. The dispute
arose over whether this new structure was a modification of the existing factory as
a whole (in which case permission was only necessary if the modification was
wesentlich i.e., "fundamental"), or whether each kiln was itself a "facility" for
which special authorization was required of the federal government. Id. at 357.
Since the relevant statute didn't specifically define "facility," the Court interpreted
legislative language in accordance with its preambular "protective purpose" and
found that every new kiln required official scrutiny. Id. at 358. This is the kind of
planned but seemingly inadvertent move towards securitization that BoehmerChristiansen foresees when she describes the concept of Vorsorge as being closely
associated with that of "Gefahrenabwehr" i.e., "defense against dangers and
threats." See Boehmer-Christiansen, supra note 7, at 36-37. In the Tunnelofen
case, of course, society was being defended from the blight of brick-baking kilns.
So how is such a shift explained? While Article 5 of the West German air-pollution
seems to impose an absolute duty to cause no environmental harm, Article 3
defines "harmful environmental effects" as "dangers, substantial detriments, or
substantial burdens," where "substantial" ("erheblich") is interpreted through
proportionality analysis (i.e., balancing between the costs and benefits).
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precautionary governance of the environment is neither impractical
nor merely altruistic,314 it is perfectly selfish and thus uniquely
human.

314. If the choice is between overregulation leading to wasteful spending (in
terms of risks discovered to be "false-positives") and under regulation (in terms of
underestimating risks, "false negatives"), it is not a stretch to say that humans may
value securing lives to saving money. See Marchant,supra note 22, at 1800.

